fix: validate NTP responses before use

handleNTPPacket() memcpy'd 80 bytes from packet.data() unconditionally,
over-reading the stack when a short or garbage UDP datagram arrives
(NTP responses are 48 bytes). The derived epoch was applied without any
sanity check — a corrupt packet silently sets an arbitrary system time,
which drives sunrise/sunset communication windows and scheduled reboots.

Changes:
- Reject packets shorter than 48 bytes (NTP_PACKET_SIZE) before reading
- Reduce buffer to NTP_PACKET_SIZE and copy only the needed bytes
- Validate NTP timestamp >= 3786825600 (2020-01-01 in NTP era) to reject
  corrupt values and prevent unsigned underflow in epoch subtraction
- On rejection, return early without clearing the NTP timeout so the
  existing retry mechanism fires naturally (no stall)

Lower bound rationale: 3786825600 is 2020-01-01 expressed in NTP seconds
(seconds since 1900). This is well before any ahoy firmware release; any
NTP time before this is unambiguously corrupt. Checking secsSince1900
directly (rather than the derived epoch) also prevents unsigned underflow
when secsSince1900 < 2208988800 (the Unix epoch offset).

src/network/AhoyNetwork.h

@@ -247,9 +247,13 @@ class AhoyNetwork {
         }
 
         void handleNTPPacket(AsyncUDPPacket packet) {
-            char buf[80];
+            if(packet.length() < NTP_PACKET_SIZE) {
+                DPRINTLN(DBG_WARN, F("NTP packet too short"));
+                return;
+            }
 
-            memcpy(buf, packet.data(), sizeof(buf));
+            uint8_t buf[NTP_PACKET_SIZE];
+            memcpy(buf, packet.data(), NTP_PACKET_SIZE);
 
             unsigned long highWord = word(buf[40], buf[41]);
             unsigned long lowWord = word(buf[42], buf[43]);
@@ -258,9 +262,19 @@ class AhoyNetwork {
             // this is NTP time (seconds since Jan 1 1900):
             unsigned long secsSince1900 = highWord << 16 | lowWord;
 
+            // 3786825600 = 2020-01-01 in NTP era (2208988800 + 1577836800);
+            // reject anything before that to guard against corrupt packets
+            // and prevent unsigned underflow in the epoch subtraction
+            if(secsSince1900 < 3786825600UL) {
+                DPRINTLN(DBG_WARN, F("NTP epoch out of range"));
+                return;
+            }
+
+            uint32_t epoch = secsSince1900 - 2208988800UL;
+
             mUdp.close();
-            mNtpTimeoutSec = 0; // clear timeout
+            mNtpTimeoutSec = 0;
-            mOnTimeCB(secsSince1900 - 2208988800UL);
+            mOnTimeCB(epoch);
         }
 
     protected: