diff --git a/src/api/core/accounts.rs b/src/api/core/accounts.rs index 699cbe95..5c8ddd6f 100644 --- a/src/api/core/accounts.rs +++ b/src/api/core/accounts.rs @@ -1203,6 +1203,7 @@ struct KeyData { account_keys: AccountKeysData, account_data: RotateAccountData, old_master_key_authentication_hash: String, + old_user_key_id: Option, new_user_key_id: Option, } @@ -1266,6 +1267,7 @@ struct RotateUserKeysData { unlock_data: CommonUnlockData, account_data: RotateAccountData, unlock_method_data: UnlockMethodData, + old_user_key_id: Option, new_user_key_id: Option, } @@ -1487,6 +1489,8 @@ struct RotateData { account_keys: ValidatedAccountKeys, account_data: RotateAccountData, unlock_data: CommonUnlockData, + /// The id of the key the client rotates from, `None` from clients that don't send it. + old_user_key_id: Option, /// `None` from clients that predate key ids. new_user_key_id: Option, /// The new user key, wrapped by the master key. @@ -1613,6 +1617,7 @@ async fn post_rotatekey(data: Json, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt: account_keys: data.account_keys.validate()?, account_data: data.account_data, unlock_data: common, + old_user_key_id: data.old_user_key_id, new_user_key_id: data.new_user_key_id, wrapped_user_key: unlock_data.master_key_encrypted_user_key, new_password: Some((unlock_data.master_key_authentication_hash, password_hint)), @@ -1646,6 +1651,14 @@ async fn rotate_account(data: RotateData, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt: No &existing_sends, )?; + // Like upstream, a client that rotates a user key that was already replaced has to sync first + // Ref: + if let (Some(current), Some(old)) = (&headers.user.key_id, &data.old_user_key_id) + && current != old + { + err_code!("The user key being rotated is not the current user key. Sync and try again.", Status::Conflict.code) + } + validate_rotation_account_keys(&data.account_keys, &headers.user, &conn).await?; // An upgrade keeps the sessions; for an account already on v2 the token means nothing and is dropped @@ -1768,7 +1781,8 @@ async fn rotate_account(data: RotateData, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt: No user.reset_security_stamp_after_key_rotation(&conn).await?; } - // The key pair first: if saving the user then fails, an upgraded account stays v1 instead of broken + // The key pair first, so that a v2 account is never saved without one. The data above is already re-encrypted by + // now, so a failure here still leaves it under a key that isn't stored (see the TODO before the first write). data.account_keys.save_signature_key_pair(&user.uuid, &conn).await?; user.save(&conn).await?; @@ -1833,6 +1847,7 @@ async fn post_rotate_user_keys( account_keys: data.wrapped_account_cryptographic_state.validate()?, account_data: data.account_data, unlock_data: data.unlock_data, + old_user_key_id: data.old_user_key_id, new_user_key_id: data.new_user_key_id, wrapped_user_key, new_password: None,