diff --git a/src/api/core/accounts.rs b/src/api/core/accounts.rs index e022807e..f26ed454 100644 --- a/src/api/core/accounts.rs +++ b/src/api/core/accounts.rs @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ use serde_json::Value; use crate::{ CONFIG, api::{ - AnonymousNotify, ApiResult, EmptyResult, JsonResult, Notify, PasswordOrOtpData, UpdateType, + AnonymousNotify, ApiResult, EmptyResult, JsonResult, LogOutReason, Notify, PasswordOrOtpData, UpdateType, core::{accept_org_invite, log_user_event, two_factor::email}, master_password_policy, register_push_device, unregister_push_device, }, @@ -48,8 +48,10 @@ pub fn routes() -> Vec { post_password, post_set_password, post_kdf, + get_key_rotation_data, post_rotatekey, post_user_key, + post_rotate_user_keys, post_sstamp, post_email_token, post_email, @@ -302,6 +304,35 @@ impl AccountKeysData { } } +impl WrappedAccountCryptographicState { + /// This shape is v2-only: the key pairs and security state were already required by the + /// deserializer, so only the values still need checking. A missing signed public key or an + /// unknown algorithm has to be an error rather than a fallback to v1, which would silently turn + /// a rotation into a downgrade. + fn validate(self) -> ApiResult { + let Some(signed_public_key) = self.public_key_encryption_key_pair.signed_public_key else { + err!("No signed public key provided for a v2 account") + }; + let Some(signature_algorithm) = SignatureAlgorithm::from_str(&self.signature_key_pair.signature_algorithm) + else { + err!(format!("Unsupported signature algorithm: {}", self.signature_key_pair.signature_algorithm)) + }; + + Ok(ValidatedAccountKeys { + private_key: self.public_key_encryption_key_pair.wrapped_private_key, + public_key: self.public_key_encryption_key_pair.public_key, + v2: Some(ValidatedV2AccountKeys { + signed_public_key, + signing_key: self.signature_key_pair.wrapped_signing_key, + verifying_key: self.signature_key_pair.verifying_key, + signature_algorithm, + security_state: self.security_state.security_state, + security_version: self.security_state.security_version, + }), + }) + } +} + impl From for ValidatedAccountKeys { fn from(keys: KeysData) -> Self { Self { @@ -1023,16 +1054,18 @@ struct UpdateEmergencyAccessData { #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")] struct UpdateResetPasswordData { organization_id: OrganizationId, - reset_password_key: String, + // Absent in a v1 -> v2 upgrade, which keeps the key the organization already holds + reset_password_key: Option, } #[derive(Deserialize)] #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")] struct KeyData { account_unlock_data: RotateAccountUnlockData, - account_keys: RotateAccountKeys, + account_keys: AccountKeysData, account_data: RotateAccountData, old_master_key_authentication_hash: String, + new_user_key_id: Option, } #[derive(Deserialize)] @@ -1041,6 +1074,8 @@ struct RotateAccountUnlockData { emergency_access_unlock_data: Vec, master_password_unlock_data: MasterPasswordUnlockData, organization_account_recovery_unlock_data: Vec, + #[serde(flatten)] + common: CommonUnlockData, } #[derive(Deserialize)] @@ -1053,13 +1088,28 @@ struct MasterPasswordUnlockData { email: String, master_key_authentication_hash: String, master_key_encrypted_user_key: String, + contained_key_id: Option, } -#[derive(Deserialize)] +/// The unlock data both rotation endpoints share. Vaultwarden has neither trusted device encryption +/// nor passkey login, so `key-rotation-data` reports none of either and these must arrive empty. +#[derive(Deserialize, Default)] #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")] -struct RotateAccountKeys { - user_key_encrypted_account_private_key: String, - account_public_key: String, +struct CommonUnlockData { + #[serde(default)] + passkey_unlock_data: Vec, + #[serde(default)] + device_key_unlock_data: Vec, + v2_upgrade_token: Option, +} + +/// Lets clients that still hold the v1 user key derive the v2 one after another client upgraded the +/// account, so a v1 -> v2 upgrade doesn't have to log every other session out. Opaque to us. +#[derive(Deserialize, Serialize)] +#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")] +struct V2UpgradeTokenData { + wrapped_user_key1: String, + wrapped_user_key2: String, } #[derive(Deserialize)] @@ -1070,6 +1120,131 @@ struct RotateAccountData { sends: Vec, } +/// Body of `rotate-user-keys`, which rotates the keys without touching the master password. +#[derive(Deserialize)] +#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")] +struct RotateUserKeysData { + wrapped_account_cryptographic_state: WrappedAccountCryptographicState, + unlock_data: RotateUserKeysUnlockData, + account_data: RotateAccountData, + unlock_method_data: UnlockMethodData, + new_user_key_id: Option, +} + +/// The v2-only account cryptographic state, where all three parts are mandatory. +#[derive(Deserialize)] +#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")] +struct WrappedAccountCryptographicState { + public_key_encryption_key_pair: PublicKeyEncryptionKeyPairData, + signature_key_pair: SignatureKeyPairData, + security_state: SecurityStateData, +} + +#[derive(Deserialize)] +#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")] +struct RotateUserKeysUnlockData { + emergency_access_unlock_data: Vec, + organization_account_recovery_unlock_data: Vec, + #[serde(flatten)] + common: CommonUnlockData, +} + +#[derive(Deserialize)] +#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")] +struct UnlockMethodData { + unlock_method: i32, + master_password_unlock_data: Option, + // `keyConnectorKeyWrappedUserKey` is deliberately not read: that unlock method is rejected. +} + +#[derive(Deserialize)] +#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")] +struct RotateMasterPasswordUnlockData { + kdf: KDFData, + salt: String, + master_key_wrapped_user_key: String, + contained_key_id: Option, +} + +/// The user key wrapped in the master password unlock data has to be the new one. +/// +/// Ref: +fn validate_contained_key_id(contained_key_id: Option<&KeyId>, new_user_key_id: Option<&KeyId>) -> EmptyResult { + match (contained_key_id, new_user_key_id) { + // Neither is sent by clients that predate key ids + (None, None) => Ok(()), + (Some(contained), Some(new)) if contained == new => Ok(()), + _ => err!("Invalid user key sent in master-password unlock data."), + } +} + +/// Ref: +enum UnlockMethod { + Tde = 0, + MasterPassword = 1, + KeyConnector = 2, +} + +/// The rotation-specific checks on the new account keys. +/// +/// A rotation re-wraps the existing keys under a new user key; it must not swap the identity the +/// account presents to others. So the public key never changes, and for an account that is already +/// v2 the verifying key doesn't either — only the *wrapped* signing key does. A v1 account may gain +/// a signature key pair, which is the v1 -> v2 upgrade. +/// +/// Ref: +async fn validate_rotation_account_keys(keys: &ValidatedAccountKeys, user: &User, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult { + if user.public_key.as_ref() != Some(&keys.public_key) { + err!("Changing the asymmetric keypair is not possible during key rotation") + } + + let Some(v2) = &keys.v2 else { + if user.is_v2() { + err!("Cannot downgrade an account from v2 to v1 encryption during key rotation") + } + // A v1 rotation: the private key stays wrapped by an AES-CBC-HMAC user key + if enc_string_type(&keys.private_key) != Some(ENC_TYPE_AES_CBC_256_HMAC_SHA256) { + err!("The provided account private key was not wrapped with AES-256-CBC-HMAC") + } + return Ok(()); + }; + + // Both a v2 rotation and the v1 -> v2 upgrade end up with a COSE user key wrapping the private keys + if enc_string_type(&v2.signing_key) != Some(ENC_TYPE_COSE_ENCRYPT0) { + err!("The provided signing key data is not wrapped with XChaCha20-Poly1305.") + } + if enc_string_type(&keys.private_key) != Some(ENC_TYPE_COSE_ENCRYPT0) { + err!("The provided private key encryption key is not wrapped with XChaCha20-Poly1305.") + } + if v2.verifying_key.is_empty() || v2.signed_public_key.is_empty() || v2.security_state.is_empty() { + err!("The v2 account keys are missing the verifying key, signed public key or security state") + } + + if !user.is_v2() { + // The v1 -> v2 upgrade, which is where the signature key pair comes from + return Ok(()); + } + + let Some(key_pair) = UserSignatureKeyPair::find_active_by_user(&user.uuid, conn).await else { + err!("The account is missing its signature key pair") + }; + if key_pair.verifying_key != v2.verifying_key { + err!("Changing the verifying key is not possible during key rotation") + } + + Ok(()) +} + +/// `AesCbc256_HmacSha256_B64`, the v1 user key +const ENC_TYPE_AES_CBC_256_HMAC_SHA256: &str = "2"; +/// `CoseEncrypt0B64`, the v2 user key +const ENC_TYPE_COSE_ENCRYPT0: &str = "7"; + +/// The encryption type of an EncString, the number before the first `.`. +fn enc_string_type(enc_string: &str) -> Option<&str> { + enc_string.split_once('.').map(|(enc_type, _)| enc_type) +} + fn validate_keydata( data: &KeyData, existing_ciphers: &[Cipher], @@ -1087,14 +1262,35 @@ fn validate_keydata( { err!("Changing the kdf variant or email is not supported during key rotation"); } - if user.public_key.as_ref() != Some(&data.account_keys.account_public_key) { - err!("Changing the asymmetric keypair is not possible during key rotation") - } + validate_rotation_data( + &data.account_data, + &data.account_unlock_data.emergency_access_unlock_data, + &data.account_unlock_data.organization_account_recovery_unlock_data, + existing_ciphers, + existing_folders, + existing_emergency_access, + existing_memberships, + existing_sends, + ) +} + +/// A rotation re-encrypts everything under the new user key, so anything left out would be +/// unreadable afterwards. Both rotation endpoints require the client to send the complete set. +#[expect(clippy::too_many_arguments, reason = "Every collection has to be cross-checked")] +fn validate_rotation_data( + account_data: &RotateAccountData, + emergency_access_unlock_data: &[UpdateEmergencyAccessData], + organization_account_recovery_unlock_data: &[UpdateResetPasswordData], + existing_ciphers: &[Cipher], + existing_folders: &[Folder], + existing_emergency_access: &[EmergencyAccess], + existing_memberships: &[Membership], + existing_sends: &[Send], +) -> EmptyResult { // Check that we're correctly rotating all the user's ciphers let existing_cipher_ids = existing_ciphers.iter().map(|c| &c.uuid).collect::>(); - let provided_cipher_ids = data - .account_data + let provided_cipher_ids = account_data .ciphers .iter() .filter(|c| c.organization_id.is_none()) @@ -1106,8 +1302,7 @@ fn validate_keydata( // Check that we're correctly rotating all the user's folders let existing_folder_ids = existing_folders.iter().map(|f| &f.uuid).collect::>(); - let provided_folder_ids = - data.account_data.folders.iter().filter_map(|f| f.id.as_ref()).collect::>(); + let provided_folder_ids = account_data.folders.iter().filter_map(|f| f.id.as_ref()).collect::>(); if !provided_folder_ids.is_superset(&existing_folder_ids) { err!("All existing folders must be included in the rotation") } @@ -1115,12 +1310,8 @@ fn validate_keydata( // Check that we're correctly rotating all the user's emergency access keys let existing_emergency_access_ids = existing_emergency_access.iter().map(|ea| &ea.uuid).collect::>(); - let provided_emergency_access_ids = data - .account_unlock_data - .emergency_access_unlock_data - .iter() - .map(|ea| &ea.id) - .collect::>(); + let provided_emergency_access_ids = + emergency_access_unlock_data.iter().map(|ea| &ea.id).collect::>(); if !provided_emergency_access_ids.is_superset(&existing_emergency_access_ids) { err!("All existing emergency access keys must be included in the rotation") } @@ -1128,9 +1319,7 @@ fn validate_keydata( // Check that we're correctly rotating all the user's reset password keys let existing_reset_password_ids = existing_memberships.iter().map(|m| &m.org_uuid).collect::>(); - let provided_reset_password_ids = data - .account_unlock_data - .organization_account_recovery_unlock_data + let provided_reset_password_ids = organization_account_recovery_unlock_data .iter() .map(|rp| &rp.organization_id) .collect::>(); @@ -1140,7 +1329,7 @@ fn validate_keydata( // Check that we're correctly rotating all the user's sends let existing_send_ids = existing_sends.iter().map(|s| &s.uuid).collect::>(); - let provided_send_ids = data.account_data.sends.iter().filter_map(|s| s.id.as_ref()).collect::>(); + let provided_send_ids = account_data.sends.iter().filter_map(|s| s.id.as_ref()).collect::>(); if !provided_send_ids.is_superset(&existing_send_ids) { err!("All existing sends must be included in the rotation") } @@ -1148,32 +1337,130 @@ fn validate_keydata( Ok(()) } +/// The public keys and encrypted keysets that participate in a key rotation, so the client can +/// re-share the new user key without having to piece this together from several endpoints. +/// +/// The four collections must always be present, even when empty: the SDK errors out if any of them +/// is missing. `trustedDeviceKeyData` and `passkeyKeyData` are always empty here, since vaultwarden +/// supports neither trusted device encryption nor passkey (PRF) login. +/// +/// Ref: +#[get("/accounts/key-management/key-rotation-data")] +async fn get_key_rotation_data(headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult { + let user_id = &headers.user.uuid; + + let mut organization_data = Vec::new(); + for membership in Membership::find_by_user(user_id, &conn).await { + // Only memberships actually enrolled in account recovery take part in the rotation. + if membership.reset_password_key.is_none() { + continue; + } + let Some(org) = Organization::find_by_uuid(&membership.org_uuid, &conn).await else { + continue; + }; + let Some(public_key) = org.public_key else { + continue; + }; + organization_data.push(json!({ + "organizationId": org.uuid, + "organizationName": org.name, + "organizationPublicKey": public_key, + "object": "organizationPasswordResetKeyData", + })); + } + + let mut emergency_access_data = Vec::new(); + for emergency_access in EmergencyAccess::find_all_confirmed_by_grantor_uuid(user_id, &conn).await { + // Without a stored key there is nothing to re-share. + if emergency_access.key_encrypted.is_none() { + continue; + } + let Some(grantee_id) = emergency_access.grantee_uuid.clone() else { + continue; + }; + let Some(grantee) = User::find_by_uuid(&grantee_id, &conn).await else { + continue; + }; + let Some(public_key) = grantee.public_key.clone() else { + continue; + }; + emergency_access_data.push(json!({ + "id": emergency_access.uuid, + "granteeId": grantee_id, + "granteeName": grantee.name, + "granteeEmail": grantee.email, + "publicKey": public_key, + "object": "emergencyAccessKeyData", + })); + } + + Ok(Json(json!({ + "organizationPasswordResetKeyData": organization_data, + "emergencyAccessKeyData": emergency_access_data, + "trustedDeviceKeyData": [], + "passkeyKeyData": [], + "object": "keyRotationData", + }))) +} + +/// How the new user key gets wrapped, which is the one part the two rotation endpoints don't share. +enum UnlockRotation { + /// `rotate-user-account-keys`: the master password changes along with the keys. + PasswordChange { + authentication_hash: String, + wrapped_user_key: String, + }, + /// `rotate-user-keys`: the password is untouched, only the wrapped user key is replaced. + WrappedUserKeyOnly { + wrapped_user_key: String, + }, +} + +/// Everything a rotation replaces, once each endpoint's wrapper has been peeled off. +struct RotateData { + account_keys: ValidatedAccountKeys, + account_data: RotateAccountData, + emergency_access_unlock_data: Vec, + organization_account_recovery_unlock_data: Vec, + v2_upgrade_token: Option, + /// Only v2 (COSE) user keys have an id, so this is `None` for a v1 -> v1 rotation. + new_user_key_id: Option, + unlock: UnlockRotation, +} + +impl CommonUnlockData { + /// We advertise no trusted devices or passkeys in `key-rotation-data`, so a client sending + /// either has produced keys for something that doesn't exist here. Silently dropping them would + /// leave the client believing an unlock method was rotated when it wasn't. + fn validate(&self) -> EmptyResult { + if !self.passkey_unlock_data.is_empty() { + err!("Passkey unlock is not supported") + } + if !self.device_key_unlock_data.is_empty() { + err!("Trusted device unlock is not supported") + } + Ok(()) + } +} + #[post("/accounts/key-management/rotate-user-account-keys", data = "")] async fn post_rotatekey(data: Json, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt: Notify<'_>) -> EmptyResult { - // TODO: See if we can wrap everything within a SQL Transaction. If something fails it should revert everything. let data: KeyData = data.into_inner(); if !headers.user.check_valid_password(&data.old_master_key_authentication_hash) { err!("Invalid password") } - // Validate the import before continuing - // Bitwarden does not process the import if there is one item invalid. - // Since we check for the size of the encrypted note length, we need to do that here to pre-validate it. - // TODO: See if we can optimize the whole cipher adding/importing and prevent duplicate code and checks. - Cipher::validate_cipher_data(&data.account_data.ciphers)?; + data.account_unlock_data.common.validate()?; let user_id = &headers.user.uuid; - - // TODO: Ideally we'd do everything after this point in a single transaction. - - let mut existing_ciphers = Cipher::find_owned_by_user(user_id, &conn).await; - let mut existing_folders = Folder::find_by_user(user_id, &conn).await; - let mut existing_emergency_access = EmergencyAccess::find_all_confirmed_by_grantor_uuid(user_id, &conn).await; + let existing_ciphers = Cipher::find_owned_by_user(user_id, &conn).await; + let existing_folders = Folder::find_by_user(user_id, &conn).await; + let existing_emergency_access = EmergencyAccess::find_all_confirmed_by_grantor_uuid(user_id, &conn).await; let mut existing_memberships = Membership::find_by_user(user_id, &conn).await; // We only rotate the reset password key if it is set. existing_memberships.retain(|m| m.reset_password_key.is_some()); - let mut existing_sends = Send::find_by_user(user_id, &conn).await; + let existing_sends = Send::find_by_user(user_id, &conn).await; validate_keydata( &data, @@ -1185,6 +1472,93 @@ async fn post_rotatekey(data: Json, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt: &headers.user, )?; + validate_contained_key_id( + data.account_unlock_data.master_password_unlock_data.contained_key_id.as_ref(), + data.new_user_key_id.as_ref(), + )?; + + let unlock = UnlockRotation::PasswordChange { + authentication_hash: data.account_unlock_data.master_password_unlock_data.master_key_authentication_hash, + wrapped_user_key: data.account_unlock_data.master_password_unlock_data.master_key_encrypted_user_key, + }; + + rotate_account( + RotateData { + account_keys: data.account_keys.validate()?, + account_data: data.account_data, + emergency_access_unlock_data: data.account_unlock_data.emergency_access_unlock_data, + organization_account_recovery_unlock_data: data + .account_unlock_data + .organization_account_recovery_unlock_data, + // This endpoint always logs every session out, so an upgrade token is never kept here. That + // also clears one left over from an earlier upgrade. Ref: upstream's AccountsKeyManagementController + v2_upgrade_token: None, + new_user_key_id: data.new_user_key_id, + unlock, + }, + (existing_ciphers, existing_folders, existing_emergency_access, existing_memberships, existing_sends), + headers, + conn, + nt, + ) + .await +} + +type ExistingRotationData = (Vec, Vec, Vec, Vec, Vec); + +/// The body shared by both rotation endpoints: re-save every piece of data the client re-encrypted, +/// then swap the account keys and the wrapped user key. +async fn rotate_account( + data: RotateData, + existing: ExistingRotationData, + headers: Headers, + conn: DbConn, + nt: Notify<'_>, +) -> EmptyResult { + // TODO: See if we can wrap everything within a SQL Transaction. If something fails it should revert everything. + let ( + mut existing_ciphers, + mut existing_folders, + mut existing_emergency_access, + mut existing_memberships, + mut existing_sends, + ) = existing; + + validate_rotation_account_keys(&data.account_keys, &headers.user, &conn).await?; + + // The upgrade token only means anything for a v1 account moving to v2: it lets sessions still + // holding the v1 user key pick up the v2 one instead of being forced to re-authenticate. For an + // account that is already v2 it is meaningless, so it gets discarded and the security stamp is + // reset, as a rotation otherwise would. That ends the refresh tokens, while the access tokens in + // use run out on their own, as upstream. + let is_upgrade = data.v2_upgrade_token.is_some() && !headers.user.is_v2(); + let upgrade_token = match &data.v2_upgrade_token { + Some(token) if is_upgrade => Some(serde_json::to_string(token)?), + _ => None, + }; + + // An upgrade can't re-wrap the account recovery keys: that needs the organization's public key + // to be trusted, and an upgrade shows the user no prompt. So the stored keys are kept, and each + // organization gets the upgrade token instead, to unwrap the v2 user key with. + // Ref: upstream's OrganizationUserRotationValidator + for reset_password_data in &data.organization_account_recovery_unlock_data { + let has_key = reset_password_data.reset_password_key.as_deref().is_some_and(|k| !k.is_empty()); + if is_upgrade && has_key { + err!("Account recovery keys cannot be rotated during a V1 to V2 upgrade rotation.") + } + if !is_upgrade && !has_key { + err!("Account recovery keys cannot be null or empty during rotation.") + } + } + + // Validate the import before continuing + // Bitwarden does not process the import if there is one item invalid. + // Since we check for the size of the encrypted note length, we need to do that here to pre-validate it. + // TODO: See if we can optimize the whole cipher adding/importing and prevent duplicate code and checks. + Cipher::validate_cipher_data(&data.account_data.ciphers)?; + + // TODO: Ideally we'd do everything after this point in a single transaction. + // Update folder data for folder_data in data.account_data.folders { // Skip `null` folder id entries. @@ -1200,7 +1574,7 @@ async fn post_rotatekey(data: Json, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt: } // Update emergency access data - for emergency_access_data in data.account_unlock_data.emergency_access_unlock_data { + for emergency_access_data in data.emergency_access_unlock_data { let Some(saved_emergency_access) = existing_emergency_access.iter_mut().find(|ea| ea.uuid == emergency_access_data.id) else { @@ -1212,14 +1586,17 @@ async fn post_rotatekey(data: Json, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt: } // Update reset password data - for reset_password_data in data.account_unlock_data.organization_account_recovery_unlock_data { + for reset_password_data in data.organization_account_recovery_unlock_data { let Some(membership) = existing_memberships.iter_mut().find(|m| m.org_uuid == reset_password_data.organization_id) else { err!("Reset password doesn't exist") }; - membership.reset_password_key = Some(reset_password_data.reset_password_key); + if !is_upgrade { + membership.reset_password_key = reset_password_data.reset_password_key; + } + membership.v2_upgrade_token.clone_from(&upgrade_token); membership.save(&conn).await?; } @@ -1249,25 +1626,126 @@ async fn post_rotatekey(data: Json, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt: // Update user data let mut user = headers.user; + let keep_sessions_alive = is_upgrade; + user.v2_upgrade_token = upgrade_token; + + data.account_keys.apply(&mut user)?; + // The old id names a key that no longer exists, so it is replaced even when the new key has none. + user.key_id = data.new_user_key_id; + + match data.unlock { + UnlockRotation::PasswordChange { + authentication_hash, + wrapped_user_key, + } => { + user.set_password(&authentication_hash, Some(wrapped_user_key), false, None, &conn).await?; + } + UnlockRotation::WrappedUserKeyOnly { + wrapped_user_key, + } => { + user.akey = wrapped_user_key; + } + } + if !keep_sessions_alive { + user.reset_security_stamp_after_key_rotation(&conn).await?; + } - user.private_key = Some(data.account_keys.user_key_encrypted_account_private_key); - user.set_password( - &data.account_unlock_data.master_password_unlock_data.master_key_authentication_hash, - Some(data.account_unlock_data.master_password_unlock_data.master_key_encrypted_user_key), - true, - None, - &conn, - ) - .await?; - - let save_result = user.save(&conn).await; + // The key pair goes first: if saving the user then fails during an upgrade, the account is still + // v1 and the key pair unused, instead of a v2 account without one, which no client could unlock. + // A failure between the two writes of a v2 rotation still needs a transaction to undo. + data.account_keys.save_signature_key_pair(&user.uuid, &conn).await?; + user.save(&conn).await?; // Prevent logging out the client where the user requested this endpoint from. // If you do logout the user it will causes issues at the client side. // Adding the device uuid will prevent this. - nt.send_logout(&user, Some(&headers.device), &conn).await; + // When the sessions were kept alive, the reason lets the other clients sync the new keys (through + // the upgrade token) instead of logging out, if they have `pm-31050-no-logout-key-upgrade-rotation`. + let reason = keep_sessions_alive.then_some(LogOutReason::KeyRotation); + nt.send_logout_with_reason(&user, Some(&headers.device), reason, &conn).await; - save_result + Ok(()) +} + +/// Rotates the account keys without changing the master password. +/// +/// Unlike `rotate-user-account-keys` this carries no proof of the master password: the request is +/// authorized by the session alone, which is how upstream defines it, and the client has to be +/// unlocked to produce the payload in the first place. +/// +/// Ref: +#[post("/accounts/key-management/rotate-user-keys", data = "")] +async fn post_rotate_user_keys( + data: Json, + headers: Headers, + conn: DbConn, + nt: Notify<'_>, +) -> EmptyResult { + let data: RotateUserKeysData = data.into_inner(); + + data.unlock_data.common.validate()?; + + let unlock = if data.unlock_method_data.unlock_method == UnlockMethod::MasterPassword as i32 { + let Some(unlock_data) = data.unlock_method_data.master_password_unlock_data else { + err!("Missing master password unlock data") + }; + if headers.user.client_kdf_type != unlock_data.kdf.kdf + || headers.user.client_kdf_iter != unlock_data.kdf.kdf_iterations + || headers.user.client_kdf_memory != unlock_data.kdf.kdf_memory + || headers.user.client_kdf_parallelism != unlock_data.kdf.kdf_parallelism + { + err!("Changing the kdf variant is not supported during key rotation") + } + if unlock_data.salt != headers.user.email { + err!("Invalid master password salt") + } + validate_contained_key_id(unlock_data.contained_key_id.as_ref(), data.new_user_key_id.as_ref())?; + UnlockRotation::WrappedUserKeyOnly { + wrapped_user_key: unlock_data.master_key_wrapped_user_key, + } + } else if data.unlock_method_data.unlock_method == UnlockMethod::Tde as i32 { + err!("Trusted device encryption is not supported") + } else if data.unlock_method_data.unlock_method == UnlockMethod::KeyConnector as i32 { + err!("Key connector is not supported") + } else { + err!("Unrecognized unlock method") + }; + + let user_id = &headers.user.uuid; + let existing_ciphers = Cipher::find_owned_by_user(user_id, &conn).await; + let existing_folders = Folder::find_by_user(user_id, &conn).await; + let existing_emergency_access = EmergencyAccess::find_all_confirmed_by_grantor_uuid(user_id, &conn).await; + let mut existing_memberships = Membership::find_by_user(user_id, &conn).await; + existing_memberships.retain(|m| m.reset_password_key.is_some()); + let existing_sends = Send::find_by_user(user_id, &conn).await; + + validate_rotation_data( + &data.account_data, + &data.unlock_data.emergency_access_unlock_data, + &data.unlock_data.organization_account_recovery_unlock_data, + &existing_ciphers, + &existing_folders, + &existing_emergency_access, + &existing_memberships, + &existing_sends, + )?; + + rotate_account( + RotateData { + account_keys: data.wrapped_account_cryptographic_state.validate()?, + account_data: data.account_data, + emergency_access_unlock_data: data.unlock_data.emergency_access_unlock_data, + organization_account_recovery_unlock_data: data.unlock_data.organization_account_recovery_unlock_data, + v2_upgrade_token: data.unlock_data.common.v2_upgrade_token, + new_user_key_id: data.new_user_key_id, + unlock, + }, + (existing_ciphers, existing_folders, existing_emergency_access, existing_memberships, existing_sends), + headers, + conn, + nt, + ) + .await } #[derive(Deserialize)] diff --git a/src/api/core/ciphers.rs b/src/api/core/ciphers.rs index 2831a1ad..b24d68f4 100644 --- a/src/api/core/ciphers.rs +++ b/src/api/core/ciphers.rs @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ use crate::{ Archive, Attachment, AttachmentId, Cipher, CipherId, Collection, CollectionCipher, CollectionGroup, CollectionId, CollectionUser, EventType, Favorite, Folder, FolderCipher, FolderId, Group, KeyId, Membership, MembershipType, OrgPolicy, OrgPolicyType, OrganizationId, RepromptType, Send, UserId, + is_data_blob_encrypted, }, }, util::{NumberOrString, deser_opt_nonempty_str, save_temp_file}, @@ -195,6 +196,15 @@ async fn sync(data: SyncData, headers: Headers, client_version: Option, pub notes: Option, fields: Option, @@ -299,6 +306,9 @@ pub struct CipherData { drivers_license: Option, passport: Option, + // The sealed blob of a v2 account's cipher, which replaces all of the fields above + data: Option, + favorite: Option, reprompt: Option, @@ -320,6 +330,34 @@ pub struct CipherData { archived_date: Option, } +/// Upstream's `[StringLength(500000)]` on `CipherRequestModel.Data` +const MAX_CIPHER_DATA_LENGTH: usize = 500_000; + +impl CipherData { + /// Checks the content the way upstream's model validation does, before anything is saved. + /// On failure, returns the offending field and the message for it. + /// + /// Ref: + pub fn validate_content(&self) -> Result<(), (&'static str, String)> { + if let Some(data) = &self.data + && data.len() > MAX_CIPHER_DATA_LENGTH + { + return Err(( + "Data", + format!("The field Data must be a string with a maximum length of {MAX_CIPHER_DATA_LENGTH}."), + )); + } + + // A blob carries the name inside it, so only the other formats need one + let is_blob = self.data.as_deref().is_some_and(is_data_blob_encrypted); + if !is_blob && self.name.as_deref().is_none_or(|n| n.trim().is_empty()) { + return Err(("Name", String::from("The Name field is required."))); + } + + Ok(()) + } +} + #[derive(Debug, Deserialize)] #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")] pub struct PartialCipherData { @@ -362,7 +400,7 @@ async fn post_ciphers_create( // cipher.save() below. enforce_personal_ownership_policy(Some(&data.cipher), &headers, &conn).await?; - let mut cipher = Cipher::new(data.cipher.r#type, data.cipher.name.clone()); + let mut cipher = Cipher::new(data.cipher.r#type, data.cipher.name.clone().unwrap_or_default()); cipher.user_uuid = Some(headers.user.uuid.clone()); cipher.save(&conn).await?; @@ -403,7 +441,7 @@ async fn post_ciphers(data: Json, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt // needed when creating a new cipher, so just ignore it unconditionally. data.last_known_revision_date = None; - let mut cipher = Cipher::new(data.r#type, data.name.clone()); + let mut cipher = Cipher::new(data.r#type, data.name.clone().unwrap_or_default()); update_cipher_from_data(&mut cipher, data, &headers, None, &conn, &nt, UpdateType::SyncCipherCreate).await?; Ok(Json(cipher.to_json(&headers.host, &headers.user.uuid, None, CipherSyncType::User, &conn).await?)) @@ -452,6 +490,10 @@ pub async fn update_cipher_from_data( enforce_personal_ownership_policy(Some(&data), headers, conn).await?; + if let Err((_, message)) = data.validate_content() { + err!(message) + } + // Check that the client isn't updating an existing cipher with stale data. // And only perform this check when not importing ciphers, else the date/time check will fail. if ut != UpdateType::None @@ -539,6 +581,15 @@ pub async fn update_cipher_from_data( } } + // A blob replaces every content field, so the per-type data below neither applies nor exists. + // `validate_content` made sure anything else has a name. + let blob = data.data.filter(|d| is_data_blob_encrypted(d)); + let name = if blob.is_some() { + String::new() + } else { + data.name.unwrap_or_default() + }; + let type_data_opt = match data.r#type { 1 => data.login, 2 => data.secure_note, @@ -551,23 +602,25 @@ pub async fn update_cipher_from_data( _ => err!("Invalid type"), }; - let type_data = if let Some(mut data) = type_data_opt { + let stored_data = if let Some(blob) = blob { + blob + } else if let Some(mut data) = type_data_opt { // Remove the 'Response' key from the base object. data.as_object_mut().unwrap().remove("response"); // Remove the 'Response' key from every Uri. if data["uris"].is_array() { data["uris"] = clean_cipher_data(data["uris"].clone()); } - data + data.to_string() } else { err!("Data missing") }; cipher.key = data.key; - cipher.name = data.name; + cipher.name = name; cipher.notes = data.notes; cipher.fields = data.fields.map(|f| clean_cipher_data(f).to_string()); - cipher.data = type_data.to_string(); + cipher.data = stored_data; cipher.password_history = data.password_history.map(|f| f.to_string()); cipher.reprompt = data.reprompt.filter(|r| *r == RepromptType::None as i32 || *r == RepromptType::Password as i32); @@ -665,7 +718,7 @@ async fn post_ciphers_import(data: Json, headers: Headers, conn: DbC let folder_id = relations_map.get(&index).and_then(|i| folders.get(*i).cloned()); cipher_data.folder_id = folder_id; - let mut cipher = Cipher::new(cipher_data.r#type, cipher_data.name.clone()); + let mut cipher = Cipher::new(cipher_data.r#type, cipher_data.name.clone().unwrap_or_default()); update_cipher_from_data(&mut cipher, cipher_data, &headers, None, &conn, &nt, UpdateType::None).await?; } diff --git a/src/api/core/organizations.rs b/src/api/core/organizations.rs index 36297d30..3ca0d326 100644 --- a/src/api/core/organizations.rs +++ b/src/api/core/organizations.rs @@ -1885,7 +1885,7 @@ async fn post_org_import( cipher_data.folder_id = None; // Replace the client-provided, unvalidated organizationId with the real target org cipher_data.organization_id = Some(org_id.clone()); - let mut cipher = Cipher::new(cipher_data.r#type, cipher_data.name.clone()); + let mut cipher = Cipher::new(cipher_data.r#type, cipher_data.name.clone().unwrap_or_default()); update_cipher_from_data( &mut cipher, cipher_data, diff --git a/src/api/mod.rs b/src/api/mod.rs index 9a79ce95..57899219 100644 --- a/src/api/mod.rs +++ b/src/api/mod.rs @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ pub use crate::api::{ icons::routes as icons_routes, identity::routes as identity_routes, notifications::routes as notifications_routes, - notifications::{AnonymousNotify, Notify, UpdateType, WS_ANONYMOUS_SUBSCRIPTIONS, WS_USERS}, + notifications::{AnonymousNotify, LogOutReason, Notify, UpdateType, WS_ANONYMOUS_SUBSCRIPTIONS, WS_USERS}, push::{ push_cipher_update, push_folder_update, push_logout, push_send_update, push_user_update, register_push_device, unregister_push_device, diff --git a/src/api/notifications.rs b/src/api/notifications.rs index 8bfcd518..55688ff9 100644 --- a/src/api/notifications.rs +++ b/src/api/notifications.rs @@ -383,23 +383,36 @@ impl WebSocketUsers { } pub async fn send_logout(&self, user: &User, acting_device: Option<&Device>, conn: &DbConn) { + self.send_logout_with_reason(user, acting_device, None, conn).await; + } + + /// A logout that clients may handle differently depending on `reason`, e.g. syncing instead of + /// logging out after a key rotation that kept the sessions alive. + pub async fn send_logout_with_reason( + &self, + user: &User, + acting_device: Option<&Device>, + reason: Option, + conn: &DbConn, + ) { // Skip any processing if both WebSockets and Push are not active if *NOTIFICATIONS_DISABLED { return; } let acting_device_id = acting_device.map(|d| d.uuid.clone()); - let data = create_update( - vec![("UserId".into(), user.uuid.to_string().into()), ("Date".into(), serialize_date(user.updated_at))], - UpdateType::LogOut, - acting_device_id, - ); + let mut payload = + vec![("UserId".into(), user.uuid.to_string().into()), ("Date".into(), serialize_date(user.updated_at))]; + if let Some(reason) = reason { + payload.push(("Reason".into(), (reason as i32).into())); + } + let data = create_update(payload, UpdateType::LogOut, acting_device_id); if CONFIG.enable_websocket() { self.send_update(&user.uuid, &data).await; } if CONFIG.push_enabled() { - push_logout(user, acting_device, conn).await; + push_logout(user, acting_device, reason, conn).await; } } @@ -667,6 +680,15 @@ fn create_ping() -> Vec { serialize(&Value::Array(vec![6.into()])) } +/// Why a logout was pushed. Absent for a plain logout. +/// +/// Ref: +/// (`KdfChange = 0` is not sent by vaultwarden yet.) +#[derive(Copy, Clone, Eq, PartialEq)] +pub enum LogOutReason { + KeyRotation = 1, +} + // https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/375af7c43b10d9da03525d41452f95de3f921541/src/Core/Enums/PushType.cs #[derive(Copy, Clone, Eq, PartialEq)] pub enum UpdateType { diff --git a/src/api/push.rs b/src/api/push.rs index e87a0985..323d1310 100644 --- a/src/api/push.rs +++ b/src/api/push.rs @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ use tokio::sync::RwLock; use crate::{ CONFIG, - api::{ApiResult, EmptyResult, UpdateType}, + api::{ApiResult, EmptyResult, LogOutReason, UpdateType}, db::{ DbConn, models::{AuthRequestId, Cipher, Device, Folder, PushId, Send, User, UserId}, @@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ pub async fn push_cipher_update(ut: UpdateType, cipher: &Cipher, device: &Device } } -pub async fn push_logout(user: &User, acting_device: Option<&Device>, conn: &DbConn) { +pub async fn push_logout(user: &User, acting_device: Option<&Device>, reason: Option, conn: &DbConn) { if Device::check_user_has_push_device(&user.uuid, conn).await { tokio::task::spawn(send_to_push_relay(json!({ "userId": user.uuid, @@ -198,7 +198,8 @@ pub async fn push_logout(user: &User, acting_device: Option<&Device>, conn: &DbC "type": UpdateType::LogOut as i32, "payload": { "userId": user.uuid, - "date": format_date(&user.updated_at) + "date": format_date(&user.updated_at), + "reason": reason.map(|r| r as i32), }, "clientType": null, "installationId": null diff --git a/src/auth.rs b/src/auth.rs index 07373389..75dbc041 100644 --- a/src/auth.rs +++ b/src/auth.rs @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ use crate::{ models::{ AttachmentId, CipherId, Collection, CollectionId, Device, DeviceId, DeviceType, EmergencyAccessId, EventType, Membership, MembershipId, MembershipStatus, MembershipType, OrgApiKeyId, OrganizationId, - SendFileId, SendId, User, UserId, UserStampException, + SendFileId, SendId, User, UserId, }, }, error::Error, @@ -662,36 +662,25 @@ impl<'r> FromRequest<'r> for Headers { err_handler!("Invalid device id") }; - let Some(user) = User::find_by_uuid(&user_id, &conn).await else { + let Some(mut user) = User::find_by_uuid(&user_id, &conn).await else { err_handler!("Device has no user associated") }; if user.security_stamp != claims.sstamp { - if let Some(stamp_exception) = - user.stamp_exception.as_deref().and_then(|s| serde_json::from_str::(s).ok()) + let Some(current_route) = request.route().and_then(|r| r.name.as_deref()) else { + err_handler!("Error getting current route for stamp exception") + }; + + let allowed = user.stamp_exceptions().iter().any(|e| e.allows(&claims.sstamp, current_route)); + + // Drop the expired exceptions, so they aren't checked for every request from now on. + if user.retain_stamp_exceptions(|e| !e.is_expired()) + && let Err(e) = user.save_stamp_exceptions(&conn).await { - let Some(current_route) = request.route().and_then(|r| r.name.as_deref()) else { - err_handler!("Error getting current route for stamp exception") - }; + error!("Error updating user: {e:#?}"); + } - // Check if the stamp exception has expired first. - // Then, check if the current route matches any of the allowed routes. - // After that check the stamp in exception matches the one in the claims. - if Utc::now().timestamp() > stamp_exception.expire { - // If the stamp exception has been expired remove it from the database. - // This prevents checking this stamp exception for new requests. - let mut user = user; - user.reset_stamp_exception(); - if let Err(e) = user.save(&conn).await { - error!("Error updating user: {e:#?}"); - } - err_handler!("Stamp exception is expired") - } else if !stamp_exception.routes.contains(¤t_route.to_owned()) { - err_handler!("Invalid security stamp: Current route and exception route do not match") - } else if stamp_exception.security_stamp != claims.sstamp { - err_handler!("Invalid security stamp for matched stamp exception") - } - } else { + if !allowed { err_handler!("Invalid security stamp") } } diff --git a/src/config.rs b/src/config.rs index 9f0ae2e1..f88eb99e 100644 --- a/src/config.rs +++ b/src/config.rs @@ -1434,6 +1434,9 @@ pub const SUPPORTED_FEATURE_FLAGS: &[&str] = &[ "ssh-key-vault-item", "pm-25373-windows-biometrics-v2", "pm-26340-linux-biometrics-v2", + "pm-31050-no-logout-key-upgrade-rotation", + "pm-27278-v2-password-registration", + "enable-account-encryption-v2-jit-password-registration", // Mobile Team "anon-addy-self-host-alias", "simple-login-self-host-alias", diff --git a/src/db/models/cipher.rs b/src/db/models/cipher.rs index fae8aaec..a0eae75c 100644 --- a/src/db/models/cipher.rs +++ b/src/db/models/cipher.rs @@ -63,6 +63,17 @@ pub struct Cipher { pub reprompt: Option, } +/// Whether `data` is a sealed cipher blob rather than the legacy per-type JSON. +/// +/// Ciphers of v2 accounts are encrypted as a single blob that carries everything, name included, +/// and is opaque to us. It is recognized the same way upstream does, by a top-level +/// `format_version` key that the legacy JSON never has. +/// +/// Ref: +pub fn is_data_blob_encrypted(data: &str) -> bool { + serde_json::from_str::(data).is_ok_and(|d| d.get("format_version").is_some()) +} + pub enum RepromptType { None = 0, Password = 1, @@ -110,6 +121,10 @@ impl Cipher { .insert(format!("Ciphers[{index}].Notes"), serde_json::to_value([&max_note_size_msg]).unwrap()); } + if let Err((field, message)) = cipher.validate_content() { + validation_errors.insert(format!("Ciphers[{index}].{field}"), serde_json::to_value([message]).unwrap()); + } + // Validate the password history if it contains `null` values and if so, return a warning if let Some(Value::Array(password_history)) = &cipher.password_history { for pwh in password_history { @@ -154,6 +169,8 @@ impl Cipher { ) -> Result { use crate::util::{format_date, validate_and_format_date}; + let is_blob_encrypted = is_data_blob_encrypted(&self.data); + let mut attachments_json: Value = Value::Null; if let Some(cipher_sync_data) = cipher_sync_data { if let Some(attachments) = cipher_sync_data.cipher_attachments.get(&self.uuid) @@ -189,124 +206,62 @@ impl Cipher { (false, false, false) }; - let fields_json: Vec<_> = self - .fields - .as_ref() - .and_then(|s| { - serde_json::from_str::>>(s) - .inspect_err(|e| warn!("Error parsing fields {e:?} for {}", self.uuid)) - .ok() - }) - .map(|d| { - d.into_iter() - .map(|mut f| { - // Check if the `type` key is a number, strings break some clients - // The fallback type is the hidden type `1`. this should prevent accidental data disclosure - // If not try to convert the string value to a number and fallback to `1` - // If it is both not a number and not a string, fallback to `1` - match f.data.get("type") { - Some(t) if t.is_number() => {} - Some(t) if t.is_string() => { - let type_num = &t.as_str().unwrap_or("1").parse::().unwrap_or(1); - f.data["type"] = json!(type_num); - } - _ => { - f.data["type"] = json!(1); + // Like upstream, a cipher that was stored without fields or password history reports them as + // null rather than as an empty list; clients keep the two apart. + let fields_json: Option> = self.fields.as_ref().map(|s| { + serde_json::from_str::>>(s) + .inspect_err(|e| warn!("Error parsing fields {e:?} for {}", self.uuid)) + .ok() + .map(|d| { + d.into_iter() + .map(|mut f| { + // Check if the `type` key is a number, strings break some clients + // The fallback type is the hidden type `1`. this should prevent accidental data disclosure + // If not try to convert the string value to a number and fallback to `1` + // If it is both not a number and not a string, fallback to `1` + match f.data.get("type") { + Some(t) if t.is_number() => {} + Some(t) if t.is_string() => { + let type_num = &t.as_str().unwrap_or("1").parse::().unwrap_or(1); + f.data["type"] = json!(type_num); + } + _ => { + f.data["type"] = json!(1); + } } - } - f.data - }) - .collect() - }) - .unwrap_or_default(); - - let password_history_json: Vec<_> = self - .password_history - .as_ref() - .and_then(|s| { - serde_json::from_str::>>(s) - .inspect_err(|e| warn!("Error parsing password history {e:?} for {}", self.uuid)) - .ok() - }) - .map(|d| { - // Check every password history item if they are valid and return it. - // If a password field has the type `null` skip it, it breaks newer Bitwarden clients - // A second check is done to verify the lastUsedDate exists and is a valid DateTime string, if not the epoch start time will be used - d.into_iter() - .filter_map(|d| match d.data.get("password") { - Some(p) if p.is_string() => Some(d.data), - _ => None, - }) - .map(|mut d| { - let lud = if let Some(l) = d.get("lastUsedDate").and_then(|l| l.as_str()) { - validate_and_format_date(l) - } else { - "1970-01-01T00:00:00.000000Z".to_owned() - }; - d["lastUsedDate"] = json!(lud); - d - }) - .collect() - }) - .unwrap_or_default(); - - // Get the type_data or a default to an empty json object '{}'. - // If not passing an empty object, mobile clients will crash. - let mut type_data_json = serde_json::from_str::>(&self.data) - .inspect_err(|_| warn!("Error parsing data field for {}", self.uuid)) - .map_or_else(|_| Value::Object(serde_json::Map::new()), |d| d.data); - - // NOTE: This was marked as *Backwards Compatibility Code*, but as of January 2021 this is still being used by upstream - // Set the first element of the Uris array as Uri, this is needed several (mobile) clients. - if self.atype == 1 { - // Upstream always has an `uri` key/value - type_data_json["uri"] = Value::Null; - if let Some(uris) = type_data_json["uris"].as_array_mut() - && !uris.is_empty() - { - // Fix uri match values first, they are only allowed to be a number or null - // If it is a string, convert it to an int or null if that fails - for uri in &mut *uris { - if uri["match"].is_string() { - let match_value = match uri["match"].as_str().unwrap_or_default().parse::() { - Ok(n) => json!(n), - _ => Value::Null, - }; - uri["match"] = match_value; - } - } - type_data_json["uri"] = uris[0]["uri"].clone(); - } - - // Check if `passwordRevisionDate` is a valid date, else convert it - if let Some(pw_revision) = type_data_json["passwordRevisionDate"].as_str() { - type_data_json["passwordRevisionDate"] = json!(validate_and_format_date(pw_revision)); - } - } - - // Fix secure note issues when data is invalid - // This breaks at least the native mobile clients - if self.atype == 2 { - match type_data_json { - Value::Object(ref t) if t.get("type").is_some_and(Value::is_number) => {} - _ => { - type_data_json = json!({"type": 0}); - } - } - } + f.data + }) + .collect() + }) + .unwrap_or_default() + }); - // Fix invalid SSH Entries - // This breaks at least the native mobile client if invalid - // The only way to fix this is by setting type_data_json to `null` - // Opening this ssh-key in the mobile client will probably crash the client, but you can edit, save and afterwards delete it - if self.atype == 5 - && (type_data_json["keyFingerprint"].as_str().is_none_or(str::is_empty) - || type_data_json["privateKey"].as_str().is_none_or(str::is_empty) - || type_data_json["publicKey"].as_str().is_none_or(str::is_empty)) - { - warn!("Error parsing ssh-key, mandatory fields are invalid for {}", self.uuid); - type_data_json = Value::Null; - } + let password_history_json: Option> = self.password_history.as_ref().map(|s| { + serde_json::from_str::>>(s) + .inspect_err(|e| warn!("Error parsing password history {e:?} for {}", self.uuid)) + .ok() + .map(|d| { + // Check every password history item if they are valid and return it. + // If a password field has the type `null` skip it, it breaks newer Bitwarden clients + // A second check is done to verify the lastUsedDate exists and is a valid DateTime string, if not the epoch start time will be used + d.into_iter() + .filter_map(|d| match d.data.get("password") { + Some(p) if p.is_string() => Some(d.data), + _ => None, + }) + .map(|mut d| { + let lud = if let Some(l) = d.get("lastUsedDate").and_then(|l| l.as_str()) { + validate_and_format_date(l) + } else { + "1970-01-01T00:00:00.000000Z".to_owned() + }; + d["lastUsedDate"] = json!(lud); + d + }) + .collect() + }) + .unwrap_or_default() + }); let collection_ids = if let Some(cipher_sync_data) = cipher_sync_data { if let Some(cipher_collections) = cipher_sync_data.cipher_collections.get(&self.uuid) { @@ -403,10 +358,86 @@ impl Cipher { _ => err!(format!("Cipher {} has an invalid type {}", self.uuid, self.atype)), }; - json_object[key] = type_data_json; + if is_blob_encrypted { + // The blob holds all of the content, so it is sent back as-is and the structured fields + // stay null, as upstream does. + json_object["data"] = json!(self.data); + json_object["name"] = Value::Null; + json_object["notes"] = Value::Null; + json_object["fields"] = Value::Null; + json_object["passwordHistory"] = Value::Null; + } else { + json_object[key] = self.legacy_type_data_json(); + } Ok(json_object) } + /// The per-type data (`login`, `card`, …) of a legacy cipher, with fixups for values that are + /// known to break clients. + fn legacy_type_data_json(&self) -> Value { + use crate::util::validate_and_format_date; + + // Get the type_data or a default to an empty json object '{}'. + // If not passing an empty object, mobile clients will crash. + let mut type_data_json = serde_json::from_str::>(&self.data) + .inspect_err(|_| warn!("Error parsing data field for {}", self.uuid)) + .map_or_else(|_| Value::Object(serde_json::Map::new()), |d| d.data); + + // NOTE: This was marked as *Backwards Compatibility Code*, but as of January 2021 this is still being used by upstream + // Set the first element of the Uris array as Uri, this is needed several (mobile) clients. + if self.atype == 1 { + // Upstream always has an `uri` key/value + type_data_json["uri"] = Value::Null; + if let Some(uris) = type_data_json["uris"].as_array_mut() + && !uris.is_empty() + { + // Fix uri match values first, they are only allowed to be a number or null + // If it is a string, convert it to an int or null if that fails + for uri in &mut *uris { + if uri["match"].is_string() { + let match_value = match uri["match"].as_str().unwrap_or_default().parse::() { + Ok(n) => json!(n), + _ => Value::Null, + }; + uri["match"] = match_value; + } + } + type_data_json["uri"] = uris[0]["uri"].clone(); + } + + // Check if `passwordRevisionDate` is a valid date, else convert it + if let Some(pw_revision) = type_data_json["passwordRevisionDate"].as_str() { + type_data_json["passwordRevisionDate"] = json!(validate_and_format_date(pw_revision)); + } + } + + // Fix secure note issues when data is invalid + // This breaks at least the native mobile clients + if self.atype == 2 { + match type_data_json { + Value::Object(ref t) if t.get("type").is_some_and(Value::is_number) => {} + _ => { + type_data_json = json!({"type": 0}); + } + } + } + + // Fix invalid SSH Entries + // This breaks at least the native mobile client if invalid + // The only way to fix this is by setting type_data_json to `null` + // Opening this ssh-key in the mobile client will probably crash the client, but you can edit, save and afterwards delete it + if self.atype == 5 + && (type_data_json["keyFingerprint"].as_str().is_none_or(str::is_empty) + || type_data_json["privateKey"].as_str().is_none_or(str::is_empty) + || type_data_json["publicKey"].as_str().is_none_or(str::is_empty)) + { + warn!("Error parsing ssh-key, mandatory fields are invalid for {}", self.uuid); + type_data_json = Value::Null; + } + + type_data_json + } + pub async fn update_users_revision(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> Vec { let mut user_uuids = Vec::new(); match self.user_uuid { diff --git a/src/db/models/mod.rs b/src/db/models/mod.rs index 14eea9a2..5131a0fd 100644 --- a/src/db/models/mod.rs +++ b/src/db/models/mod.rs @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ mod user_signature_key_pair; pub use self::archive::Archive; pub use self::attachment::{Attachment, AttachmentId}; pub use self::auth_request::{AuthRequest, AuthRequestId}; -pub use self::cipher::{Cipher, CipherId, RepromptType}; +pub use self::cipher::{Cipher, CipherId, RepromptType, is_data_blob_encrypted}; pub use self::collection::{Collection, CollectionCipher, CollectionId, CollectionUser}; pub use self::device::{Device, DeviceId, DeviceType, DeviceWithAuthRequest, PushId}; pub use self::emergency_access::{EmergencyAccess, EmergencyAccessId, EmergencyAccessStatus, EmergencyAccessType}; @@ -40,5 +40,5 @@ pub use self::sso_auth::{OIDCAuthenticatedUser, OIDCCodeResponseError, SsoAuth}; pub use self::two_factor::{TwoFactor, TwoFactorType}; pub use self::two_factor_duo_context::TwoFactorDuoContext; pub use self::two_factor_incomplete::TwoFactorIncomplete; -pub use self::user::{Invitation, KeyId, SsoUser, User, UserId, UserKdfType, UserStampException}; +pub use self::user::{Invitation, KeyId, SsoUser, User, UserId, UserKdfType}; pub use self::user_signature_key_pair::{SignatureAlgorithm, UserSignatureKeyPair}; diff --git a/src/db/models/user.rs b/src/db/models/user.rs index b382c8f0..51c56251 100644 --- a/src/db/models/user.rs +++ b/src/db/models/user.rs @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ use serde_json::Value; use crate::{ CONFIG, api::EmptyResult, + auth::DEFAULT_ACCESS_VALIDITY, crypto, db::{ DbConn, @@ -109,13 +110,28 @@ enum UserStatus { _Disabled = 2, } +/// A previous security stamp that is still accepted, until `expire`. #[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)] pub struct UserStampException { - pub routes: Vec, + /// The routes the stamp is still accepted on, or `None` for any route. + pub routes: Option>, pub security_stamp: String, pub expire: i64, } +impl UserStampException { + pub fn is_expired(&self) -> bool { + Utc::now().timestamp() > self.expire + } + + /// Whether this exception lets a token carrying `security_stamp` through on `route`. + pub fn allows(&self, security_stamp: &str, route: &str) -> bool { + !self.is_expired() + && self.security_stamp == security_stamp + && self.routes.as_ref().is_none_or(|routes| routes.iter().any(|r| r == route)) + } +} + /// Local methods impl User { pub const CLIENT_KDF_TYPE_DEFAULT: i32 = UserKdfType::Pbkdf2 as i32; @@ -239,10 +255,38 @@ impl User { pub async fn reset_security_stamp(&mut self, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult { self.security_stamp = get_uuid(); + // A reset is meant to end the other sessions, which a key rotation's grace would undo. The + // route exceptions stay, since they are set right before a reset, for the stamp it replaces. + self.retain_stamp_exceptions(|e| e.routes.is_some()); Device::rotate_refresh_tokens_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await?; Ok(()) } + /// Resets the security stamp after a key rotation, while letting the access tokens already + /// issued keep working until they expire. + /// + /// This is what upstream does: there the stamp is only checked when a token is refreshed, so a + /// rotation invalidates refresh tokens but not the access tokens in use. Clients rely on it to + /// keep a session going across a rotation. Chained rotations keep every earlier stamp that is + /// still within its window. + pub async fn reset_security_stamp_after_key_rotation(&mut self, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult { + let previous_stamp = self.security_stamp.clone(); + let mut grace: Vec = + self.stamp_exceptions().into_iter().filter(|e| e.routes.is_none() && !e.is_expired()).collect(); + + self.reset_security_stamp(conn).await?; + + grace.push(UserStampException { + routes: None, + security_stamp: previous_stamp, + expire: (Utc::now() + *DEFAULT_ACCESS_VALIDITY).timestamp(), + }); + let mut exceptions = self.stamp_exceptions(); + exceptions.extend(grace); + self.set_stamp_exceptions(&exceptions); + Ok(()) + } + /// Set the stamp_exception to only allow a subsequent request matching a specific route using the current security-stamp. /// /// # Arguments @@ -251,17 +295,56 @@ impl User { /// After these 2 minutes this stamp will expire. /// pub fn set_stamp_exception(&mut self, route_exception: Vec) { - let stamp_exception = UserStampException { - routes: route_exception, + self.set_stamp_exceptions(&[UserStampException { + routes: Some(route_exception), security_stamp: self.security_stamp.clone(), expire: (Utc::now() + TimeDelta::try_minutes(2).unwrap()).timestamp(), + }]); + } + + /// The previous security stamps that are still accepted, expired ones included. + pub fn stamp_exceptions(&self) -> Vec { + let Some(stored) = self.stamp_exception.as_deref() else { + return Vec::new(); }; - self.stamp_exception = Some(serde_json::to_string(&stamp_exception).unwrap_or_default()); + // Before key rotations kept sessions alive, only a single route exception was stored. + serde_json::from_str::>(stored) + .or_else(|_| serde_json::from_str::(stored).map(|e| vec![e])) + .unwrap_or_default() + } + + fn set_stamp_exceptions(&mut self, exceptions: &[UserStampException]) { + self.stamp_exception = if exceptions.is_empty() { + None + } else { + Some(serde_json::to_string(&exceptions).unwrap_or_default()) + }; + } + + /// Persists only `stamp_exception`, for callers holding a user read earlier in the request. + /// + /// A full `save` would write back every other column as it was read, undoing anything saved in + /// the meantime, such as the new keys of a key rotation made from another device. + pub async fn save_stamp_exceptions(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult { + let uuid = self.uuid.clone(); + let stamp_exception = self.stamp_exception.clone(); + conn.run(move |conn| { + diesel::update(users::table.filter(users::uuid.eq(uuid))) + .set(users::stamp_exception.eq(stamp_exception)) + .execute(conn) + .map_res("Error updating user stamp exceptions") + }) + .await } - /// Resets the stamp_exception to prevent re-use of the previous security-stamp - pub fn reset_stamp_exception(&mut self) { - self.stamp_exception = None; + /// Drops the stamp exceptions that don't match `keep`. Returns whether any were dropped. + pub fn retain_stamp_exceptions(&mut self, keep: impl Fn(&UserStampException) -> bool) -> bool { + let mut exceptions = self.stamp_exceptions(); + let before = exceptions.len(); + exceptions.retain(keep); + let changed = exceptions.len() != before; + self.set_stamp_exceptions(&exceptions); + changed } pub fn display_name(&self) -> &str { @@ -327,8 +410,8 @@ impl User { }) } - pub fn v2_upgrade_token_json(&self) -> Value { - self.v2_upgrade_token.as_ref().and_then(|token| serde_json::from_str(token).ok()).unwrap_or(Value::Null) + pub fn v2_upgrade_token_json(&self) -> Option { + self.v2_upgrade_token.as_ref().and_then(|token| serde_json::from_str(token).ok()) } pub async fn to_json(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> Value {