diff --git a/.typos.toml b/.typos.toml index 7034a849..ca870f4e 100644 --- a/.typos.toml +++ b/.typos.toml @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ extend-ignore-re = [ "COSE", "COSEKey", "COSEAlgorithm", + "CoseEncrypt0", # Ignore this specific string as it's valid "Ensure they are valid OTPs", # This word is misspelled upstream diff --git a/migrations/mysql/2026-09-21-120000_add_v2_upgrade_token/down.sql b/migrations/mysql/2026-09-21-120000_add_v2_upgrade_token/down.sql new file mode 100644 index 00000000..89e12c15 --- /dev/null +++ b/migrations/mysql/2026-09-21-120000_add_v2_upgrade_token/down.sql @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN v2_upgrade_token; +ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN v2_upgrade_token; diff --git a/migrations/mysql/2026-09-21-120000_add_v2_upgrade_token/up.sql b/migrations/mysql/2026-09-21-120000_add_v2_upgrade_token/up.sql new file mode 100644 index 00000000..45c58491 --- /dev/null +++ b/migrations/mysql/2026-09-21-120000_add_v2_upgrade_token/up.sql @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN v2_upgrade_token TEXT; +ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN v2_upgrade_token TEXT; diff --git a/migrations/postgresql/2026-09-21-120000_add_v2_upgrade_token/down.sql b/migrations/postgresql/2026-09-21-120000_add_v2_upgrade_token/down.sql new file mode 100644 index 00000000..89e12c15 --- /dev/null +++ b/migrations/postgresql/2026-09-21-120000_add_v2_upgrade_token/down.sql @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN v2_upgrade_token; +ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN v2_upgrade_token; diff --git a/migrations/postgresql/2026-09-21-120000_add_v2_upgrade_token/up.sql b/migrations/postgresql/2026-09-21-120000_add_v2_upgrade_token/up.sql new file mode 100644 index 00000000..45c58491 --- /dev/null +++ b/migrations/postgresql/2026-09-21-120000_add_v2_upgrade_token/up.sql @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN v2_upgrade_token TEXT; +ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN v2_upgrade_token TEXT; diff --git a/migrations/sqlite/2026-09-21-120000_add_v2_upgrade_token/down.sql b/migrations/sqlite/2026-09-21-120000_add_v2_upgrade_token/down.sql new file mode 100644 index 00000000..89e12c15 --- /dev/null +++ b/migrations/sqlite/2026-09-21-120000_add_v2_upgrade_token/down.sql @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN v2_upgrade_token; +ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN v2_upgrade_token; diff --git a/migrations/sqlite/2026-09-21-120000_add_v2_upgrade_token/up.sql b/migrations/sqlite/2026-09-21-120000_add_v2_upgrade_token/up.sql new file mode 100644 index 00000000..45c58491 --- /dev/null +++ b/migrations/sqlite/2026-09-21-120000_add_v2_upgrade_token/up.sql @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN v2_upgrade_token TEXT; +ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN v2_upgrade_token TEXT; diff --git a/src/api/core/accounts.rs b/src/api/core/accounts.rs index d23c81f9..e4f75982 100644 --- a/src/api/core/accounts.rs +++ b/src/api/core/accounts.rs @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ use std::collections::HashSet; use chrono::Utc; +use num_traits::FromPrimitive; use rocket::{ http::Status, request::{FromRequest, Outcome, Request}, @@ -11,7 +12,7 @@ use serde_json::Value; use crate::{ CONFIG, api::{ - AnonymousNotify, ApiResult, EmptyResult, JsonResult, Notify, PasswordOrOtpData, UpdateType, + AnonymousNotify, ApiResult, EmptyResult, JsonResult, LogOutReason, Notify, PasswordOrOtpData, UpdateType, core::{accept_org_invite, log_user_event, two_factor::email}, master_password_policy, register_push_device, unregister_push_device, }, @@ -48,8 +49,10 @@ pub fn routes() -> Vec { post_password, post_set_password, post_kdf, + get_key_rotation_data, post_rotatekey, post_user_key, + post_rotate_user_keys, post_sstamp, post_email_token, post_email, @@ -310,6 +313,23 @@ impl AccountKeysData { } } +impl WrappedAccountCryptographicState { + /// This shape is v2-only: the key pairs and security state were already required by the + /// deserializer, so a missing signed public key fails the all-or-nothing check in + /// [`AccountKeysData::validate`] rather than falling back to v1, which would silently turn a + /// rotation into a downgrade. + fn validate(self) -> ApiResult { + AccountKeysData { + user_key_encrypted_account_private_key: None, + account_public_key: None, + public_key_encryption_key_pair: Some(self.public_key_encryption_key_pair), + signature_key_pair: Some(self.signature_key_pair), + security_state: Some(self.security_state), + } + .validate() + } +} + impl From for ValidatedAccountKeys { fn from(keys: KeysData) -> Self { Self { @@ -1066,43 +1086,62 @@ struct UpdateEmergencyAccessData { #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")] struct UpdateResetPasswordData { organization_id: OrganizationId, - reset_password_key: String, + // Absent in a v1 -> v2 upgrade, which keeps the key the organization already holds + reset_password_key: Option, } #[derive(Deserialize)] #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")] struct KeyData { account_unlock_data: RotateAccountUnlockData, - account_keys: RotateAccountKeys, + account_keys: AccountKeysData, account_data: RotateAccountData, old_master_key_authentication_hash: String, + new_user_key_id: Option, } #[derive(Deserialize)] #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")] struct RotateAccountUnlockData { - emergency_access_unlock_data: Vec, master_password_unlock_data: MasterPasswordUnlockData, - organization_account_recovery_unlock_data: Vec, + #[serde(flatten)] + common: CommonUnlockData, } #[derive(Deserialize)] #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")] struct MasterPasswordUnlockData { - kdf_type: i32, - kdf_iterations: i32, - kdf_parallelism: Option, - kdf_memory: Option, + #[serde(flatten)] + kdf: KDFData, email: String, master_key_authentication_hash: String, master_key_encrypted_user_key: String, + contained_key_id: Option, } +/// The unlock data both rotation endpoints share. Vaultwarden has neither trusted device encryption +/// nor passkey login, so `key-rotation-data` reports none of either and these must arrive empty. +/// +/// Ref: #[derive(Deserialize)] #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")] -struct RotateAccountKeys { - user_key_encrypted_account_private_key: String, - account_public_key: String, +struct CommonUnlockData { + emergency_access_unlock_data: Vec, + organization_account_recovery_unlock_data: Vec, + #[serde(default)] + passkey_unlock_data: Vec, + #[serde(default)] + device_key_unlock_data: Vec, + v2_upgrade_token: Option, +} + +/// Lets clients that still hold the v1 user key derive the v2 one after another client upgraded the +/// account, so a v1 -> v2 upgrade doesn't have to log every other session out. Opaque to us. +#[derive(Deserialize, Serialize)] +#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")] +struct V2UpgradeTokenData { + wrapped_user_key1: String, + wrapped_user_key2: String, } #[derive(Deserialize)] @@ -1113,31 +1152,148 @@ struct RotateAccountData { sends: Vec, } -fn validate_keydata( - data: &KeyData, +/// Body of `rotate-user-keys`, which rotates the keys without touching the master password. +#[derive(Deserialize)] +#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")] +struct RotateUserKeysData { + wrapped_account_cryptographic_state: WrappedAccountCryptographicState, + unlock_data: CommonUnlockData, + account_data: RotateAccountData, + unlock_method_data: UnlockMethodData, + new_user_key_id: Option, +} + +/// The v2-only account cryptographic state, where all three parts are mandatory. +#[derive(Deserialize)] +#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")] +struct WrappedAccountCryptographicState { + public_key_encryption_key_pair: PublicKeyEncryptionKeyPairData, + signature_key_pair: SignatureKeyPairData, + security_state: SecurityStateData, +} + +#[derive(Deserialize)] +#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")] +struct UnlockMethodData { + unlock_method: i32, + master_password_unlock_data: Option, + // `keyConnectorKeyWrappedUserKey` is deliberately not read: that unlock method is rejected. +} + +#[derive(Deserialize)] +#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")] +struct RotateMasterPasswordUnlockData { + kdf: KDFData, + salt: String, + master_key_wrapped_user_key: String, + contained_key_id: Option, +} + +/// The user key wrapped in the master password unlock data has to be the new one. +/// +/// Ref: +fn validate_contained_key_id(contained_key_id: Option<&KeyId>, new_user_key_id: Option<&KeyId>) -> EmptyResult { + match (contained_key_id, new_user_key_id) { + // Neither is sent by clients that predate key ids + (None, None) => Ok(()), + (Some(contained), Some(new)) if contained == new => Ok(()), + _ => err!("Invalid user key sent in master-password unlock data."), + } +} + +/// Ref: +#[derive(num_derive::FromPrimitive)] +enum UnlockMethod { + Tde = 0, + MasterPassword = 1, + KeyConnector = 2, +} + +/// The rotation-specific checks on the new account keys. +/// +/// A rotation re-wraps the existing keys under a new user key; it must not swap the identity the +/// account presents to others. So the public key never changes, and for an account that is already +/// v2 the verifying key doesn't either — only the *wrapped* signing key does. A v1 account may gain +/// a signature key pair, which is the v1 -> v2 upgrade. +/// +/// Ref: +async fn validate_rotation_account_keys(keys: &ValidatedAccountKeys, user: &User, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult { + if user.public_key.as_ref() != Some(&keys.public_key) { + err!("Changing the asymmetric keypair is not possible during key rotation") + } + + let Some(v2) = &keys.v2 else { + if user.is_v2() { + err!("Cannot downgrade an account from v2 to v1 encryption during key rotation") + } + // A v1 rotation: the private key stays wrapped by an AES-CBC-HMAC user key + if enc_string_type(&keys.private_key) != Some(ENC_TYPE_AES_CBC_256_HMAC_SHA256) { + err!("The provided account private key was not wrapped with AES-256-CBC-HMAC") + } + return Ok(()); + }; + + // Both a v2 rotation and the v1 -> v2 upgrade end up with a COSE user key wrapping the private keys + if enc_string_type(&v2.signing_key) != Some(ENC_TYPE_COSE_ENCRYPT0) { + err!("The provided signing key data is not wrapped with XChaCha20-Poly1305.") + } + if enc_string_type(&keys.private_key) != Some(ENC_TYPE_COSE_ENCRYPT0) { + err!("The provided private key encryption key is not wrapped with XChaCha20-Poly1305.") + } + if v2.verifying_key.is_empty() || v2.signed_public_key.is_empty() || v2.security_state.is_empty() { + err!("The v2 account keys are missing the verifying key, signed public key or security state") + } + + if !user.is_v2() { + // The v1 -> v2 upgrade, which is where the signature key pair comes from + return Ok(()); + } + + let Some(key_pair) = UserSignatureKeyPair::find_by_user(&user.uuid, conn).await else { + err!("The account is missing its signature key pair") + }; + if key_pair.verifying_key != v2.verifying_key { + err!("Changing the verifying key is not possible during key rotation") + } + + Ok(()) +} + +/// `AesCbc256_HmacSha256_B64`, the v1 user key +const ENC_TYPE_AES_CBC_256_HMAC_SHA256: &str = "2"; +/// `CoseEncrypt0B64`, the v2 user key +const ENC_TYPE_COSE_ENCRYPT0: &str = "7"; + +/// The encryption type of an EncString, the number before the first `.`. +fn enc_string_type(enc_string: &str) -> Option<&str> { + enc_string.split_once('.').map(|(enc_type, _)| enc_type) +} + +impl KDFData { + /// Whether these are the settings the user already has, which a key rotation can't change. + fn is_unchanged_for(&self, user: &User) -> bool { + user.client_kdf_type == self.kdf + && user.client_kdf_iter == self.kdf_iterations + && user.client_kdf_memory == self.kdf_memory + && user.client_kdf_parallelism == self.kdf_parallelism + } +} + +/// A rotation re-encrypts everything under the new user key, so anything left out would be +/// unreadable afterwards. Both rotation endpoints require the client to send the complete set. +fn validate_rotation_data( + data: &RotateData, existing_ciphers: &[Cipher], existing_folders: &[Folder], existing_emergency_access: &[EmergencyAccess], existing_memberships: &[Membership], existing_sends: &[Send], - user: &User, ) -> EmptyResult { - if user.client_kdf_type != data.account_unlock_data.master_password_unlock_data.kdf_type - || user.client_kdf_iter != data.account_unlock_data.master_password_unlock_data.kdf_iterations - || user.client_kdf_memory != data.account_unlock_data.master_password_unlock_data.kdf_memory - || user.client_kdf_parallelism != data.account_unlock_data.master_password_unlock_data.kdf_parallelism - || user.email != data.account_unlock_data.master_password_unlock_data.email - { - err!("Changing the kdf variant or email is not supported during key rotation"); - } - if user.public_key.as_ref() != Some(&data.account_keys.account_public_key) { - err!("Changing the asymmetric keypair is not possible during key rotation") - } + let account_data = &data.account_data; // Check that we're correctly rotating all the user's ciphers let existing_cipher_ids = existing_ciphers.iter().map(|c| &c.uuid).collect::>(); - let provided_cipher_ids = data - .account_data + let provided_cipher_ids = account_data .ciphers .iter() .filter(|c| c.organization_id.is_none()) @@ -1149,8 +1305,7 @@ fn validate_keydata( // Check that we're correctly rotating all the user's folders let existing_folder_ids = existing_folders.iter().map(|f| &f.uuid).collect::>(); - let provided_folder_ids = - data.account_data.folders.iter().filter_map(|f| f.id.as_ref()).collect::>(); + let provided_folder_ids = account_data.folders.iter().filter_map(|f| f.id.as_ref()).collect::>(); if !provided_folder_ids.is_superset(&existing_folder_ids) { err!("All existing folders must be included in the rotation") } @@ -1158,12 +1313,8 @@ fn validate_keydata( // Check that we're correctly rotating all the user's emergency access keys let existing_emergency_access_ids = existing_emergency_access.iter().map(|ea| &ea.uuid).collect::>(); - let provided_emergency_access_ids = data - .account_unlock_data - .emergency_access_unlock_data - .iter() - .map(|ea| &ea.id) - .collect::>(); + let provided_emergency_access_ids = + data.unlock_data.emergency_access_unlock_data.iter().map(|ea| &ea.id).collect::>(); if !provided_emergency_access_ids.is_superset(&existing_emergency_access_ids) { err!("All existing emergency access keys must be included in the rotation") } @@ -1172,7 +1323,7 @@ fn validate_keydata( let existing_reset_password_ids = existing_memberships.iter().map(|m| &m.org_uuid).collect::>(); let provided_reset_password_ids = data - .account_unlock_data + .unlock_data .organization_account_recovery_unlock_data .iter() .map(|rp| &rp.organization_id) @@ -1183,7 +1334,7 @@ fn validate_keydata( // Check that we're correctly rotating all the user's sends let existing_send_ids = existing_sends.iter().map(|s| &s.uuid).collect::>(); - let provided_send_ids = data.account_data.sends.iter().filter_map(|s| s.id.as_ref()).collect::>(); + let provided_send_ids = account_data.sends.iter().filter_map(|s| s.id.as_ref()).collect::>(); if !provided_send_ids.is_superset(&existing_send_ids) { err!("All existing sends must be included in the rotation") } @@ -1191,35 +1342,142 @@ fn validate_keydata( Ok(()) } +/// The public keys and encrypted keysets that participate in a key rotation, so the client can +/// re-share the new user key without having to piece this together from several endpoints. +/// +/// The four collections must always be present, even when empty: the SDK errors out if any of them +/// is missing. `trustedDeviceKeyData` and `passkeyKeyData` are always empty here, since vaultwarden +/// supports neither trusted device encryption nor passkey (PRF) login. +/// +/// Ref: +#[get("/accounts/key-management/key-rotation-data")] +async fn get_key_rotation_data(headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult { + let user_id = &headers.user.uuid; + + let mut organization_data = Vec::new(); + for membership in Membership::find_by_user(user_id, &conn).await { + // Only memberships actually enrolled in account recovery take part in the rotation. + if membership.reset_password_key.is_none() { + continue; + } + let Some(org) = Organization::find_by_uuid(&membership.org_uuid, &conn).await else { + continue; + }; + let Some(public_key) = org.public_key else { + continue; + }; + organization_data.push(json!({ + "organizationId": org.uuid, + "organizationName": org.name, + "organizationPublicKey": public_key, + "object": "organizationPasswordResetKeyData", + })); + } + + let mut emergency_access_data = Vec::new(); + for emergency_access in EmergencyAccess::find_all_confirmed_by_grantor_uuid(user_id, &conn).await { + // Without a stored key there is nothing to re-share. + if emergency_access.key_encrypted.is_none() { + continue; + } + let Some(grantee_id) = emergency_access.grantee_uuid.clone() else { + continue; + }; + let Some(grantee) = User::find_by_uuid(&grantee_id, &conn).await else { + continue; + }; + let Some(public_key) = grantee.public_key.clone() else { + continue; + }; + emergency_access_data.push(json!({ + "id": emergency_access.uuid, + "granteeId": grantee_id, + "granteeName": grantee.name, + "granteeEmail": grantee.email, + "publicKey": public_key, + "object": "emergencyAccessKeyData", + })); + } + + Ok(Json(json!({ + "organizationPasswordResetKeyData": organization_data, + "emergencyAccessKeyData": emergency_access_data, + "trustedDeviceKeyData": [], + "passkeyKeyData": [], + "object": "keyRotationData", + }))) +} + +/// Everything a rotation replaces, once each endpoint's wrapper has been peeled off. +struct RotateData { + account_keys: ValidatedAccountKeys, + account_data: RotateAccountData, + unlock_data: CommonUnlockData, + /// Only v2 (COSE) user keys have an id, so this is `None` for a v1 -> v1 rotation. + new_user_key_id: Option, + /// The new user key, wrapped by the master key. + wrapped_user_key: String, + /// Only for `rotate-user-account-keys`, where the master password changes along with the keys. + new_password_hash: Option, +} + +impl CommonUnlockData { + /// We advertise no trusted devices or passkeys in `key-rotation-data`, so a client sending + /// either has produced keys for something that doesn't exist here. Silently dropping them would + /// leave the client believing an unlock method was rotated when it wasn't. + fn validate(&self) -> EmptyResult { + if !self.passkey_unlock_data.is_empty() { + err!("Passkey unlock is not supported") + } + if !self.device_key_unlock_data.is_empty() { + err!("Trusted device unlock is not supported") + } + Ok(()) + } +} + #[post("/accounts/key-management/rotate-user-account-keys", data = "")] async fn post_rotatekey(data: Json, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt: Notify<'_>) -> EmptyResult { - // TODO: See if we can wrap everything within a SQL Transaction. If something fails it should revert everything. let data: KeyData = data.into_inner(); if !headers.user.check_valid_password(&data.old_master_key_authentication_hash) { err!("Invalid password") } - // This only rotates the keys of a v1 account. A v2 account's signing key would stay wrapped by the - // old user key, and a v1 account can't be upgraded here, since the signature key pair isn't read. - // Either would leave an account that can't be unlocked. - if headers.user.is_v2() { - err!("Key rotation is not supported for v2 accounts") - } - if !data.account_keys.user_key_encrypted_account_private_key.starts_with("2.") { - err!("The provided account private key was not wrapped with AES-256-CBC-HMAC") + let unlock_data = data.account_unlock_data.master_password_unlock_data; + if !unlock_data.kdf.is_unchanged_for(&headers.user) || unlock_data.email != headers.user.email { + err!("Changing the kdf variant or email is not supported during key rotation"); } + validate_contained_key_id(unlock_data.contained_key_id.as_ref(), data.new_user_key_id.as_ref())?; + + let mut common = data.account_unlock_data.common; + // This endpoint always logs every session out, so an upgrade token is never kept here. That + // also clears one left over from an earlier upgrade. Ref: upstream's AccountsKeyManagementController + common.v2_upgrade_token = None; + + rotate_account( + RotateData { + account_keys: data.account_keys.validate()?, + account_data: data.account_data, + unlock_data: common, + new_user_key_id: data.new_user_key_id, + wrapped_user_key: unlock_data.master_key_encrypted_user_key, + new_password_hash: Some(unlock_data.master_key_authentication_hash), + }, + headers, + conn, + nt, + ) + .await +} - // Validate the import before continuing - // Bitwarden does not process the import if there is one item invalid. - // Since we check for the size of the encrypted note length, we need to do that here to pre-validate it. - // TODO: See if we can optimize the whole cipher adding/importing and prevent duplicate code and checks. - Cipher::validate_cipher_data(&data.account_data.ciphers)?; +/// The body shared by both rotation endpoints: check that the client re-encrypted everything, re-save +/// it, then swap the account keys and the wrapped user key. +async fn rotate_account(data: RotateData, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt: Notify<'_>) -> EmptyResult { + // TODO: See if we can wrap everything within a SQL Transaction. If something fails it should revert everything. + data.unlock_data.validate()?; let user_id = &headers.user.uuid; - - // TODO: Ideally we'd do everything after this point in a single transaction. - let mut existing_ciphers = Cipher::find_owned_by_user(user_id, &conn).await; let mut existing_folders = Folder::find_by_user(user_id, &conn).await; let mut existing_emergency_access = EmergencyAccess::find_all_confirmed_by_grantor_uuid(user_id, &conn).await; @@ -1228,16 +1486,50 @@ async fn post_rotatekey(data: Json, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt: existing_memberships.retain(|m| m.reset_password_key.is_some()); let mut existing_sends = Send::find_by_user(user_id, &conn).await; - validate_keydata( + validate_rotation_data( &data, &existing_ciphers, &existing_folders, &existing_emergency_access, &existing_memberships, &existing_sends, - &headers.user, )?; + validate_rotation_account_keys(&data.account_keys, &headers.user, &conn).await?; + + // The upgrade token only means anything for a v1 account moving to v2: it lets sessions still + // holding the v1 user key pick up the v2 one instead of being forced to re-authenticate. For an + // account that is already v2 it is meaningless, so it gets discarded and the security stamp is + // reset, as a rotation otherwise would. That ends the refresh tokens, while the access tokens in + // use run out on their own, as upstream. + let is_upgrade = data.unlock_data.v2_upgrade_token.is_some() && !headers.user.is_v2(); + let upgrade_token = match &data.unlock_data.v2_upgrade_token { + Some(token) if is_upgrade => Some(serde_json::to_string(token)?), + _ => None, + }; + + // An upgrade can't re-wrap the account recovery keys: that needs the organization's public key + // to be trusted, and an upgrade shows the user no prompt. So the stored keys are kept, and each + // organization gets the upgrade token instead, to unwrap the v2 user key with. + // Ref: upstream's OrganizationUserRotationValidator + for reset_password_data in &data.unlock_data.organization_account_recovery_unlock_data { + let has_key = reset_password_data.reset_password_key.as_deref().is_some_and(|k| !k.is_empty()); + if is_upgrade && has_key { + err!("Account recovery keys cannot be rotated during a V1 to V2 upgrade rotation.") + } + if !is_upgrade && !has_key { + err!("Account recovery keys cannot be null or empty during rotation.") + } + } + + // Validate the import before continuing + // Bitwarden does not process the import if there is one item invalid. + // Since we check for the size of the encrypted note length, we need to do that here to pre-validate it. + // TODO: See if we can optimize the whole cipher adding/importing and prevent duplicate code and checks. + Cipher::validate_cipher_data(&data.account_data.ciphers)?; + + // TODO: Ideally we'd do everything after this point in a single transaction. + // Update folder data for folder_data in data.account_data.folders { // Skip `null` folder id entries. @@ -1253,7 +1545,7 @@ async fn post_rotatekey(data: Json, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt: } // Update emergency access data - for emergency_access_data in data.account_unlock_data.emergency_access_unlock_data { + for emergency_access_data in data.unlock_data.emergency_access_unlock_data { let Some(saved_emergency_access) = existing_emergency_access.iter_mut().find(|ea| ea.uuid == emergency_access_data.id) else { @@ -1265,14 +1557,17 @@ async fn post_rotatekey(data: Json, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt: } // Update reset password data - for reset_password_data in data.account_unlock_data.organization_account_recovery_unlock_data { + for reset_password_data in data.unlock_data.organization_account_recovery_unlock_data { let Some(membership) = existing_memberships.iter_mut().find(|m| m.org_uuid == reset_password_data.organization_id) else { err!("Reset password doesn't exist") }; - membership.reset_password_key = Some(reset_password_data.reset_password_key); + if !is_upgrade { + membership.reset_password_key = reset_password_data.reset_password_key; + } + membership.v2_upgrade_token.clone_from(&upgrade_token); membership.save(&conn).await?; } @@ -1294,33 +1589,95 @@ async fn post_rotatekey(data: Json, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt: }; // Prevent triggering cipher updates via WebSockets by settings UpdateType::None - // The user sessions are invalidated because all the ciphers were re-encrypted and thus triggering an update could cause issues. - // We force the users to logout after the user has been saved to try and prevent these issues. + // Other sessions still hold the old user key, so an update to a re-encrypted cipher could cause issues. + // After the user is saved they are logged out, or on an upgrade, told to sync the new key. update_cipher_from_data(saved_cipher, cipher_data, &headers, None, &conn, &nt, UpdateType::None).await?; } } // Update user data let mut user = headers.user; + user.v2_upgrade_token = upgrade_token; - user.private_key = Some(data.account_keys.user_key_encrypted_account_private_key); - user.set_password( - &data.account_unlock_data.master_password_unlock_data.master_key_authentication_hash, - Some(data.account_unlock_data.master_password_unlock_data.master_key_encrypted_user_key), - true, - None, - &conn, - ) - .await?; + data.account_keys.apply(&mut user)?; + // The old id names a key that no longer exists, so it is replaced even when the new key has none. + user.key_id = data.new_user_key_id; - let save_result = user.save(&conn).await; + user.akey = data.wrapped_user_key; + if let Some(new_password_hash) = data.new_password_hash { + user.set_password(&new_password_hash, None, false, None, &conn).await?; + } + // An upgrade keeps the sessions alive, see `is_upgrade` above + if !is_upgrade { + user.reset_security_stamp_after_key_rotation(&conn).await?; + } + + // The key pair goes first: if saving the user then fails during an upgrade, the account is still + // v1 and the key pair unused, instead of a v2 account without one, which no client could unlock. + // A failure between the two writes of a v2 rotation still needs a transaction to undo. + data.account_keys.save_signature_key_pair(&user.uuid, &conn).await?; + user.save(&conn).await?; // Prevent logging out the client where the user requested this endpoint from. // If you do logout the user it will causes issues at the client side. // Adding the device uuid will prevent this. - nt.send_logout(&user, Some(&headers.device), &conn).await; + // When the sessions were kept alive, the reason lets the other clients sync the new keys (through + // the upgrade token) instead of logging out, if they have `pm-31050-no-logout-key-upgrade-rotation`. + let reason = is_upgrade.then_some(LogOutReason::KeyRotation); + nt.send_logout_with_reason(&user, Some(&headers.device), reason, &conn).await; - save_result + Ok(()) +} + +/// Rotates the account keys without changing the master password. +/// +/// Unlike `rotate-user-account-keys` this carries no proof of the master password: the request is +/// authorized by the session alone, which is how upstream defines it, and the client has to be +/// unlocked to produce the payload in the first place. +/// +/// Ref: +#[post("/accounts/key-management/rotate-user-keys", data = "")] +async fn post_rotate_user_keys( + data: Json, + headers: Headers, + conn: DbConn, + nt: Notify<'_>, +) -> EmptyResult { + let data: RotateUserKeysData = data.into_inner(); + + let wrapped_user_key = match UnlockMethod::from_i32(data.unlock_method_data.unlock_method) { + Some(UnlockMethod::MasterPassword) => { + let Some(unlock_data) = data.unlock_method_data.master_password_unlock_data else { + err!("Missing master password unlock data") + }; + if !unlock_data.kdf.is_unchanged_for(&headers.user) { + err!("Changing the kdf variant is not supported during key rotation") + } + if unlock_data.salt != headers.user.email { + err!("Invalid master password salt") + } + validate_contained_key_id(unlock_data.contained_key_id.as_ref(), data.new_user_key_id.as_ref())?; + unlock_data.master_key_wrapped_user_key + } + Some(UnlockMethod::Tde) => err!("Trusted device encryption is not supported"), + Some(UnlockMethod::KeyConnector) => err!("Key connector is not supported"), + None => err!("Unrecognized unlock method"), + }; + + rotate_account( + RotateData { + account_keys: data.wrapped_account_cryptographic_state.validate()?, + account_data: data.account_data, + unlock_data: data.unlock_data, + new_user_key_id: data.new_user_key_id, + wrapped_user_key, + new_password_hash: None, + }, + headers, + conn, + nt, + ) + .await } #[derive(Deserialize)] diff --git a/src/api/core/ciphers.rs b/src/api/core/ciphers.rs index d16a8a41..e174c5ad 100644 --- a/src/api/core/ciphers.rs +++ b/src/api/core/ciphers.rs @@ -197,11 +197,14 @@ async fn sync(data: SyncData, headers: Headers, client_version: Option, conn: &DbConn) { + self.send_logout_with_reason(user, acting_device, None, conn).await; + } + + /// A logout that clients may handle differently depending on `reason`, e.g. syncing instead of + /// logging out after a key rotation that kept the sessions alive. + pub async fn send_logout_with_reason( + &self, + user: &User, + acting_device: Option<&Device>, + reason: Option, + conn: &DbConn, + ) { // Skip any processing if both WebSockets and Push are not active if *NOTIFICATIONS_DISABLED { return; } let acting_device_id = acting_device.map(|d| d.uuid.clone()); - let data = create_update( - vec![("UserId".into(), user.uuid.to_string().into()), ("Date".into(), serialize_date(user.updated_at))], - UpdateType::LogOut, - acting_device_id, - ); + let mut payload = + vec![("UserId".into(), user.uuid.to_string().into()), ("Date".into(), serialize_date(user.updated_at))]; + if let Some(reason) = reason { + payload.push(("Reason".into(), (reason as i32).into())); + } + let data = create_update(payload, UpdateType::LogOut, acting_device_id); if CONFIG.enable_websocket() { self.send_update(&user.uuid, &data).await; } if CONFIG.push_enabled() { - push_logout(user, acting_device, conn).await; + push_logout(user, acting_device, reason, conn).await; } } @@ -667,6 +680,15 @@ fn create_ping() -> Vec { serialize(&Value::Array(vec![6.into()])) } +/// Why a logout was pushed. Absent for a plain logout. +/// +/// Ref: +/// (`KdfChange = 0` is not sent by vaultwarden yet.) +#[derive(Copy, Clone, Eq, PartialEq)] +pub enum LogOutReason { + KeyRotation = 1, +} + // https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/375af7c43b10d9da03525d41452f95de3f921541/src/Core/Enums/PushType.cs #[derive(Copy, Clone, Eq, PartialEq)] pub enum UpdateType { diff --git a/src/api/push.rs b/src/api/push.rs index e87a0985..323d1310 100644 --- a/src/api/push.rs +++ b/src/api/push.rs @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ use tokio::sync::RwLock; use crate::{ CONFIG, - api::{ApiResult, EmptyResult, UpdateType}, + api::{ApiResult, EmptyResult, LogOutReason, UpdateType}, db::{ DbConn, models::{AuthRequestId, Cipher, Device, Folder, PushId, Send, User, UserId}, @@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ pub async fn push_cipher_update(ut: UpdateType, cipher: &Cipher, device: &Device } } -pub async fn push_logout(user: &User, acting_device: Option<&Device>, conn: &DbConn) { +pub async fn push_logout(user: &User, acting_device: Option<&Device>, reason: Option, conn: &DbConn) { if Device::check_user_has_push_device(&user.uuid, conn).await { tokio::task::spawn(send_to_push_relay(json!({ "userId": user.uuid, @@ -198,7 +198,8 @@ pub async fn push_logout(user: &User, acting_device: Option<&Device>, conn: &DbC "type": UpdateType::LogOut as i32, "payload": { "userId": user.uuid, - "date": format_date(&user.updated_at) + "date": format_date(&user.updated_at), + "reason": reason.map(|r| r as i32), }, "clientType": null, "installationId": null diff --git a/src/auth.rs b/src/auth.rs index 07373389..8f4d0ada 100644 --- a/src/auth.rs +++ b/src/auth.rs @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ use crate::{ models::{ AttachmentId, CipherId, Collection, CollectionId, Device, DeviceId, DeviceType, EmergencyAccessId, EventType, Membership, MembershipId, MembershipStatus, MembershipType, OrgApiKeyId, OrganizationId, - SendFileId, SendId, User, UserId, UserStampException, + SendFileId, SendId, User, UserId, }, }, error::Error, @@ -667,31 +667,13 @@ impl<'r> FromRequest<'r> for Headers { }; if user.security_stamp != claims.sstamp { - if let Some(stamp_exception) = - user.stamp_exception.as_deref().and_then(|s| serde_json::from_str::(s).ok()) - { - let Some(current_route) = request.route().and_then(|r| r.name.as_deref()) else { - err_handler!("Error getting current route for stamp exception") - }; + let Some(current_route) = request.route().and_then(|r| r.name.as_deref()) else { + err_handler!("Error getting current route for stamp exception") + }; - // Check if the stamp exception has expired first. - // Then, check if the current route matches any of the allowed routes. - // After that check the stamp in exception matches the one in the claims. - if Utc::now().timestamp() > stamp_exception.expire { - // If the stamp exception has been expired remove it from the database. - // This prevents checking this stamp exception for new requests. - let mut user = user; - user.reset_stamp_exception(); - if let Err(e) = user.save(&conn).await { - error!("Error updating user: {e:#?}"); - } - err_handler!("Stamp exception is expired") - } else if !stamp_exception.routes.contains(¤t_route.to_owned()) { - err_handler!("Invalid security stamp: Current route and exception route do not match") - } else if stamp_exception.security_stamp != claims.sstamp { - err_handler!("Invalid security stamp for matched stamp exception") - } - } else { + // Expired exceptions are dropped the next time the stamp is reset, not here: writing them + // back from this request could undo a reset made since the user was read. + if !user.stamp_exceptions().iter().any(|e| e.allows(&claims.sstamp, current_route)) { err_handler!("Invalid security stamp") } } diff --git a/src/config.rs b/src/config.rs index 55799f68..fd03342d 100644 --- a/src/config.rs +++ b/src/config.rs @@ -1434,8 +1434,11 @@ pub const SUPPORTED_FEATURE_FLAGS: &[&str] = &[ "ssh-key-vault-item", "pm-25373-windows-biometrics-v2", "pm-26340-linux-biometrics-v2", + "pm-31050-no-logout-key-upgrade-rotation", "pm-27278-v2-password-registration", "enable-account-encryption-v2-jit-password-registration", + "pm-30144-sdk-key-rotation", + "force-upgrade-v2-encryption", // Mobile Team "anon-addy-self-host-alias", "simple-login-self-host-alias", diff --git a/src/db/models/mod.rs b/src/db/models/mod.rs index 8521557c..5131a0fd 100644 --- a/src/db/models/mod.rs +++ b/src/db/models/mod.rs @@ -40,5 +40,5 @@ pub use self::sso_auth::{OIDCAuthenticatedUser, OIDCCodeResponseError, SsoAuth}; pub use self::two_factor::{TwoFactor, TwoFactorType}; pub use self::two_factor_duo_context::TwoFactorDuoContext; pub use self::two_factor_incomplete::TwoFactorIncomplete; -pub use self::user::{Invitation, KeyId, SsoUser, User, UserId, UserKdfType, UserStampException}; +pub use self::user::{Invitation, KeyId, SsoUser, User, UserId, UserKdfType}; pub use self::user_signature_key_pair::{SignatureAlgorithm, UserSignatureKeyPair}; diff --git a/src/db/models/organization.rs b/src/db/models/organization.rs index 353a406e..657a9884 100644 --- a/src/db/models/organization.rs +++ b/src/db/models/organization.rs @@ -54,6 +54,10 @@ pub struct Membership { pub atype: i32, pub reset_password_key: Option, pub external_id: Option, + /// A copy of the user's v2 upgrade token, kept when a v1 -> v2 upgrade leaves the account + /// recovery key (`reset_password_key`) wrapped by the v1 user key. It lets the organization + /// unwrap the v2 user key from it. Opaque to us, like `User::v2_upgrade_token`. + pub v2_upgrade_token: Option, } #[derive(Identifiable, Queryable, Insertable, AsChangeset)] @@ -271,6 +275,7 @@ impl Membership { atype: MembershipType::User as i32, reset_password_key: None, external_id: None, + v2_upgrade_token: None, } } diff --git a/src/db/models/user.rs b/src/db/models/user.rs index f1e1b367..6b4658ed 100644 --- a/src/db/models/user.rs +++ b/src/db/models/user.rs @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ use serde_json::Value; use crate::{ CONFIG, api::EmptyResult, + auth::DEFAULT_ACCESS_VALIDITY, crypto, db::{ DbConn, @@ -78,6 +79,9 @@ pub struct User { pub signed_public_key: Option, pub security_state: Option, pub security_version: Option, + /// JSON `{"wrappedUserKey1": ..., "wrappedUserKey2": ...}`, letting clients that still hold the + /// v1 user key obtain the v2 one after another client performed the upgrade. Opaque to us. + pub v2_upgrade_token: Option, } #[derive(Identifiable, Queryable, Insertable)] @@ -106,13 +110,28 @@ enum UserStatus { _Disabled = 2, } +/// A previous security stamp that is still accepted, until `expire`. #[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)] pub struct UserStampException { - pub routes: Vec, + /// The routes the stamp is still accepted on, or `None` for any route. + pub routes: Option>, pub security_stamp: String, pub expire: i64, } +impl UserStampException { + pub fn is_expired(&self) -> bool { + Utc::now().timestamp() > self.expire + } + + /// Whether this exception lets a token carrying `security_stamp` through on `route`. + pub fn allows(&self, security_stamp: &str, route: &str) -> bool { + !self.is_expired() + && self.security_stamp == security_stamp + && self.routes.as_ref().is_none_or(|routes| routes.iter().any(|r| r == route)) + } +} + /// Local methods impl User { pub const CLIENT_KDF_TYPE_DEFAULT: i32 = UserKdfType::Pbkdf2 as i32; @@ -169,6 +188,7 @@ impl User { signed_public_key: None, security_state: None, security_version: None, + v2_upgrade_token: None, } } @@ -235,10 +255,41 @@ impl User { pub async fn reset_security_stamp(&mut self, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult { self.security_stamp = get_uuid(); + // A reset is meant to end the other sessions, which a key rotation's grace would undo. The + // route exceptions stay, since they are set right before a reset, for the stamp it replaces. + // This is also where expired exceptions get dropped. + let mut exceptions = self.stamp_exceptions(); + exceptions.retain(|e| e.routes.is_some() && !e.is_expired()); + self.set_stamp_exceptions(&exceptions); Device::rotate_refresh_tokens_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await?; Ok(()) } + /// Resets the security stamp after a key rotation, while letting the access tokens already + /// issued keep working until they expire. + /// + /// This is what upstream does: there the stamp is only checked when a token is refreshed, so a + /// rotation invalidates refresh tokens but not the access tokens in use. Clients rely on it to + /// keep a session going across a rotation. Chained rotations keep every earlier stamp that is + /// still within its window. + pub async fn reset_security_stamp_after_key_rotation(&mut self, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult { + let previous_stamp = self.security_stamp.clone(); + let mut grace: Vec = + self.stamp_exceptions().into_iter().filter(|e| e.routes.is_none() && !e.is_expired()).collect(); + + self.reset_security_stamp(conn).await?; + + grace.push(UserStampException { + routes: None, + security_stamp: previous_stamp, + expire: (Utc::now() + *DEFAULT_ACCESS_VALIDITY).timestamp(), + }); + let mut exceptions = self.stamp_exceptions(); + exceptions.extend(grace); + self.set_stamp_exceptions(&exceptions); + Ok(()) + } + /// Set the stamp_exception to only allow a subsequent request matching a specific route using the current security-stamp. /// /// # Arguments @@ -247,17 +298,30 @@ impl User { /// After these 2 minutes this stamp will expire. /// pub fn set_stamp_exception(&mut self, route_exception: Vec) { - let stamp_exception = UserStampException { - routes: route_exception, + self.set_stamp_exceptions(&[UserStampException { + routes: Some(route_exception), security_stamp: self.security_stamp.clone(), expire: (Utc::now() + TimeDelta::try_minutes(2).unwrap()).timestamp(), + }]); + } + + /// The previous security stamps that are still accepted, expired ones included. + pub fn stamp_exceptions(&self) -> Vec { + let Some(stored) = self.stamp_exception.as_deref() else { + return Vec::new(); }; - self.stamp_exception = Some(serde_json::to_string(&stamp_exception).unwrap_or_default()); + // Before key rotations kept sessions alive, only a single route exception was stored. + serde_json::from_str::>(stored) + .or_else(|_| serde_json::from_str::(stored).map(|e| vec![e])) + .unwrap_or_default() } - /// Resets the stamp_exception to prevent re-use of the previous security-stamp - pub fn reset_stamp_exception(&mut self) { - self.stamp_exception = None; + fn set_stamp_exceptions(&mut self, exceptions: &[UserStampException]) { + self.stamp_exception = if exceptions.is_empty() { + None + } else { + Some(serde_json::to_string(&exceptions).unwrap_or_default()) + }; } pub fn display_name(&self) -> &str { @@ -323,6 +387,10 @@ impl User { }) } + pub fn v2_upgrade_token_json(&self) -> Option { + self.v2_upgrade_token.as_ref().and_then(|token| serde_json::from_str(token).ok()) + } + pub async fn to_json(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> Value { let mut orgs_json = Vec::new(); for c in Membership::find_confirmed_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await { diff --git a/src/db/schema.rs b/src/db/schema.rs index 57b6c215..00a58a75 100644 --- a/src/db/schema.rs +++ b/src/db/schema.rs @@ -221,6 +221,7 @@ table! { signed_public_key -> Nullable, security_state -> Nullable, security_version -> Nullable, + v2_upgrade_token -> Nullable, } } @@ -258,6 +259,7 @@ table! { atype -> Integer, reset_password_key -> Nullable, external_id -> Nullable, + v2_upgrade_token -> Nullable, } }