diff --git a/playwright/tests/passkey.spec.ts b/playwright/tests/passkey.spec.ts
index 08fab773..da6bf7f1 100644
--- a/playwright/tests/passkey.spec.ts
+++ b/playwright/tests/passkey.spec.ts
@@ -895,4 +895,96 @@ test.describe('Passkey UI flows', () => {
         await unlockWithPasskey(page);
         await expect(page).toHaveURL(/\/(vault|setup-extension)/, { timeout: 30_000 });
     });
+
+    test('Deleted passkey is refused at login', async ({ page }) => {
+        // Pins the security property that a credential removed server-side can
+        // no longer authenticate. The CDP authenticator keeps its resident key
+        // after the server-side delete, so it still presents a cryptographically
+        // valid assertion — the "remove first, second still unlocks" test above
+        // DETACHES it for determinism; here we deliberately leave it attached so
+        // the deleted credential DOES answer the discoverable `get()`, and assert
+        // the grant refuses it because the credential row is gone (lookup misses
+        // → 4xx, no token).
+        await addVirtualAuthenticator(page);
+        const user = freshUser('deleted-cred');
+
+        await createAccount(test, page, user);
+        await enrollLoginPasskey(page, user.password, 'deleted-key', { useForEncryption: true });
+
+        // Remove the only passkey server-side; the authenticator's resident
+        // credential is intentionally left in place so it still answers below.
+        await removeLoginPasskey(page, user.password, 'deleted-key');
+        await utils.logout(test, page, user);
+
+        // The authenticator presents a valid assertion for the now-deleted
+        // credential; the grant must come back 4xx with no token. Response is
+        // the oracle, robust against web-vault UI wording.
+        const tokenResponse = page.waitForResponse(
+            (r) => r.url().includes('/identity/connect/token') && r.request().method() === 'POST',
+            { timeout: 30_000 },
+        );
+        await clickLoginWithPasskey(page);
+
+        const res = await tokenResponse;
+        expect(res.status(), 'deleted-credential passkey grant must be rejected').toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(400);
+        const body: any = await res.json();
+        expect(body.access_token, 'deleted credential must not receive an access token').toBeUndefined();
+    });
+
+    test('Disabled account cannot complete a real passkey login', async ({ page, request }) => {
+        // Complements the request-level forged-handle test above. That one
+        // drives the PRE-verification path: a bogus assertion fails at
+        // `identify_discoverable_authentication` before any account-state
+        // check runs. This test drives a CRYPTOGRAPHICALLY VALID assertion
+        // from an enrolled credential all the way through signature
+        // verification and into the POST-verification `if !user.enabled`
+        // gate in `webauthn_login` (src/api/identity.rs), which must still
+        // reject the disabled account with the generic AUTH_FAILED (4xx).
+        // The unverified-email gate immediately below it shares this branch.
+        await addVirtualAuthenticator(page);
+        const user = freshUser('disabled');
+
+        await createAccount(test, page, user);
+        await enrollLoginPasskey(page, user.password, 'disabled-key', { useForEncryption: true });
+        await utils.logout(test, page, user);
+
+        // Disable the account while the real discoverable credential remains
+        // enrolled, so the assertion verifies but the account-state gate fires.
+        await adminLogin(request);
+        const adminUser = await adminGetUserByEmail(request, user.email);
+        const disableRes = await request.post(`/admin/users/${adminUser.id}/disable`, {
+            headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+            failOnStatusCode: false,
+        });
+        expect(disableRes.status()).toBe(200);
+
+        try {
+            // The connector iframe POSTs the verified assertion to the
+            // webauthn grant; for a disabled user it must come back 4xx,
+            // never a token. Asserting on the response (rather than a toast
+            // string) keeps the check robust against web-vault UI wording.
+            const tokenResponse = page.waitForResponse(
+                (r) => r.url().includes('/identity/connect/token') && r.request().method() === 'POST',
+                { timeout: 30_000 },
+            );
+            await clickLoginWithPasskey(page);
+
+            // A verified assertion for a disabled account must be rejected by
+            // the grant (4xx) with no token issued. Asserting on the response
+            // (rather than a toast string or post-failure page layout) keeps
+            // the check robust against web-vault UI wording; with no token the
+            // SPA has nothing to unlock with, so the response is the oracle.
+            const res = await tokenResponse;
+            expect(res.status(), 'disabled-account passkey grant must be rejected').toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(400);
+            const body: any = await res.json();
+            expect(body.access_token, 'disabled account must not receive an access token').toBeUndefined();
+        } finally {
+            // Re-enable so the shared default-config vault instance is left
+            // clean for any subsequent test in this describe.
+            await request.post(`/admin/users/${adminUser.id}/enable`, {
+                headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+                failOnStatusCode: false,
+            });
+        }
+    });
 });
diff --git a/playwright/tests/setups/2fa.ts b/playwright/tests/setups/2fa.ts
index 7f60b5e8..87194066 100644
--- a/playwright/tests/setups/2fa.ts
+++ b/playwright/tests/setups/2fa.ts
@@ -12,7 +12,9 @@ import { openAvatarMenu, submitMasterPasswordVerification } from './user';
  *   - `mail2fa`  — email OTP; the helper retrieves the code from `mailBuffer`
  *   - `fido2`    — WebAuthn-as-2FA (the bundled web vault labels this
  *                  provider "FIDO2 WebAuthn" in en_GB / "Passkey" in en).
- *                  Currently unimplemented; `submitTwoFactor` throws.
+ *                  The connector iframe auto-fires WebAuthn on mount, so
+ *                  `submitTwoFactor` just waits for the resulting navigation
+ *                  (the caller must have a virtual authenticator attached).
  */
 export type TwoFactor =
     | { kind: 'totp', totp: OTPAuth.TOTP }
@@ -28,12 +30,29 @@ const PICKER_LABEL: Record<TwoFactor['kind'], RegExp> = {
     fido2: /Passkey|FIDO2/i,
 };
 
+/** URL pattern the SPA lands on after a successful 2FA — vault, lock
+ *  screen (PRF unlock required), or the install-extension nudge. Used to
+ *  short-circuit `ensure2FAProvider` when the webauthn-connector iframe
+ *  auto-fires and navigates before we get a chance to probe its DOM. */
+const POST_TWO_FACTOR_URL = /#\/(vault|setup-extension|lock)\b/;
+
 /** If the page isn't already showing the input for the requested 2FA
  *  kind (i.e. some other provider is the default), click "Select another
  *  method" → the target provider row. No-op when the requested kind's
  *  input is already visible (single-provider case, or it was already the
- *  default). */
+ *  default), or when the FIDO2 auto-fire has already completed and the
+ *  page has navigated past `/#/2fa`. */
 async function ensure2FAProvider(page: Page, kind: TwoFactor['kind']) {
+    // Auto-fire short-circuit: the webauthn-connector iframe runs the
+    // WebAuthn ceremony as soon as it mounts, and a virtual authenticator
+    // with auto-presence finishes it in milliseconds. By the time this
+    // helper runs the page may already have left `/#/2fa`, so waiting for
+    // the iframe or the picker would time out on UI that's no longer in
+    // the DOM. Bail before probing.
+    if (POST_TWO_FACTOR_URL.test(page.url())) {
+        return;
+    }
+
     const probe = kind === 'fido2'
         ? page.locator('iframe[src*="webauthn-connector"]')
         : page.getByLabel(/Verification code/);
@@ -44,9 +63,19 @@ async function ensure2FAProvider(page: Page, kind: TwoFactor['kind']) {
     // `/#/2fa` mount happens after a navigation chain) and a too-short
     // probe would race into the switcher path, which can collide with
     // the connector's auto-fire when the default is already FIDO2.
-    if (await probe.first().isVisible({ timeout: 5_000 }).catch(() => false)) {
+    //
+    // For FIDO2 specifically, the auto-fire can also complete *during*
+    // the mount-grace window — racing the probe against the post-2FA
+    // navigation catches both "iframe mounted" and "ceremony already
+    // finished" outcomes.
+    const visible = probe.first().waitFor({ state: 'visible', timeout: 5_000 })
+        .then(() => true).catch(() => false);
+    const complete = page.waitForURL(POST_TWO_FACTOR_URL, { timeout: 5_000 })
+        .then(() => true).catch(() => false);
+    if (await Promise.race([visible, complete])) {
         return;
     }
+
     const switcherText = /Select another method|Need a different method/i;
     const switcher = page
         .getByRole('button', { name: switcherText })