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Commit Graph

1 Commits (a46c01ff46c69e37a3f8ab2ba649cddca8b80890)

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
tom27052006	054a249004	Harden the trusted device flow Findings from a review of the earlier commits. A key rotation dropped the device key pairs along with the wrapped user keys, so the devices listed in `/devices/update-trust` could never be trusted again and silently lost their trust on every rotation. Those key pairs are wrapped with the device key, which a rotation does not touch, so they now stay and the re-wrap works. The invalidation also moved ahead of the new user key: failing after it had been written left devices handing out a key that no longer opens the vault. The three key blobs are now checked against the shape of an `EncString` instead of only for emptiness, as upstream does, which also keeps multi-megabyte values out of those columns. `/auth-requests/admin-request` is rate limited and reuses the open request of a device instead of adding one per attempt, which mailed every administrator again each time. Only confirmed memberships are asked, and answered: an invitation that was never accepted is not a membership yet, a revoked one is not one anymore, and neither should learn the address, the IP and the device of the asker. `UserDecryptionOptions` reports the same condition, so no way out is announced that would be refused when taken. The bulk endpoints skip what they cannot answer rather than failing the whole call after having answered everything before it, matching upstream, and are bounded. The purge does its work per type in the database instead of reading the table and deleting row by row, with indexes to go with it. Also: approving an auth request is limited to the newest one of a device, `GET /auth-requests/<id>` refuses an expired request like the anonymous lookup already did, the approval notification addresses the device that asked rather than the administrator's, and accepting an invitation while enrolling is tied to the trusted device flow it was meant for.	2 weeks ago