topaLE/vaultwarden - vaultwarden - Gitea: Git with a cup of tea

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Rune Darrud	c9c81f3b02	Fix defects found by a second adversarial review The member permissions object could not be written back. The read shape emits permissions null for anyone who is not a manage-all member, but the write models declared a plain map with serde(default), which only covers a missing field: an explicit null failed to deserialize and the request was rejected before the handler ran. Reading a member and sending it straight back therefore failed for every member except the manage-all case the previous test covered. The field is optional now, and the smoke test round-trips a plain member as well. Reinvite was the one member write that could still reach an owner, and it can change an owner from invited to accepted, so it takes the same guard as the rest. Group updates log before mutating, so a failure part way through the collection associations cannot leave an unaudited change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2 months ago
Rune Darrud	7f2911231a	Expose member permissions so manage-all survives a write The write endpoints derive the access_all flag from the raw type plus the three collection permissions, but the member serializer emitted neither the custom role nor the permissions object. A client that read a manage-all member and wrote it back unchanged therefore dropped that member from every collection, because the information needed to round-trip was not in the response. The member object now reports the custom role and its permissions the same way the internal serializers do, which is also the shape upstream uses: Permissions is part of the shared member model and is returned on reads as well as accepted on writes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2 months ago
Rune Darrud	b1473be414	Harden the Public API member and group write endpoints Adversarial review of the new endpoints turned up several defects. Ownership is now out of reach of a Public API client. The internal endpoints only let an Owner grant, change or remove Owner, and that check cannot be applied here because there is no user behind the request. Since the organization API key can be created by an Admin, a client could previously promote itself to Owner and take over the organization. Granting the Owner role and acting on an existing owner are both refused now, which subsumes the narrower last confirmed owner guard. An omitted groups list on a member update no longer unassigns every group. Upstream leaves group access untouched when the field is absent and only collections reset on omission, so groups is optional now. An omitted accessAll on a group update no longer clears the flag, and an omitted externalId no longer clears the directory matching key that /public/organization/import relies on to match members and groups. Revoked members are reported with the upstream status of -1 instead of the internal offset encoding, matching every other serializer in the codebase. Restore refuses a member who is not revoked, rather than saving nothing and logging a restore that did not happen, and group creation is logged before its collection associations so a failure cannot leave an unaudited group. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2 months ago
Rune Darrud	2a9c148f1d	Add smoke test for the Public API member and group write endpoints Boots a throwaway instance against a seeded SQLite database and exercises every member and group write endpoint end to end, asserting on the resulting state rather than just the status code. Covers the guards that protect organization integrity: the last confirmed owner cannot be demoted, revoked or deleted; collections, groups and members from another organization are rejected; ids belonging to another organization return 404; and writes require a token. It also pins two behaviours that are easy to regress: a group update leaves member assignments alone, and every write is recorded in the event log with no acting user and no device type. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2 months ago
Rune Darrud	96b46c9ae9	Add smoke test for the organization Public API read endpoints Boots a throwaway instance against a temporary SQLite database seeded with two organizations (each with members, groups, collections and their access associations), mints an organization API token, and asserts on every read endpoint: member/group/collection lists and details, the direct member-to-collection grant on member detail, the group-to-collection grant on group and collection detail, and that collection responses omit the encrypted name. It also asserts the organization scoping boundary (ids owned by the second organization return 404 through the first org's token) and that an unauthenticated request returns 401. The script exits non-zero if any assertion fails, so it can be run as a check. It builds the binary when one is not supplied via VW_BIN, uses a throwaway port and temp directory, and cleans up on exit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>	3 months ago