vaultwarden/src/api/identity.rs

use chrono::Utc;
use num_traits::FromPrimitive;
use rocket::{
    Route,
    form::{Form, FromForm},
    http::{Accept, Cookie, CookieJar, MediaType, SameSite},
    response::Redirect,
    serde::json::Json,
};
use serde_json::Value;

use crate::{
    CONFIG,
    api::{
        ApiResult, EmptyResult, JsonResult,
        core::{
            accounts::{PreloginData, RegisterData, kdf_upgrade, prelogin, register},
            log_user_event,
            two_factor::{
                authenticator, duo_oidc, email, enforce_2fa_policy, is_twofactor_provider_usable, webauthn, yubikey,
            },
        },
        identity_master_password_policy,
        push::register_push_device,
    },
    auth,
    auth::{AuthMethod, ClientHeaders, ClientIp, Secure, generate_organization_api_key_login_claims},
    crypto,
    db::{
        DbConn,
        models::{
            AuthRequest, AuthRequestId, Device, DeviceId, DeviceType, EventType, Invitation, Membership,
            OIDCCodeResponseError, OrgPolicy, OrgPolicyType, Organization, OrganizationApiKey, OrganizationId, SendId,
            SsoAuth, SsoUser, TwoFactor, TwoFactorIncomplete, TwoFactorType, User, UserId,
        },
    },
    error::MapResult,
    mail, sso,
    sso::{OIDCCode, OIDCCodeChallenge, OIDCCodeVerifier, OIDCState},
    util,
};

pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
    routes![
        login,
        post_prelogin,
        prelogin_password,
        register_verification_email,
        register_verification_email_clicked,
        register_finish,
        prevalidate,
        authorize,
        oidcsignin,
        oidcsignin_error
    ]
}

#[post("/connect/token", data = "<data>")]
async fn login(data: Form<ConnectData>, client_header: ClientHeaders, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
    let data: ConnectData = data.into_inner();

    let mut user_id: Option<UserId> = None;

    let login_result = match data.grant_type.as_ref() {
        "refresh_token" => {
            check_is_some(data.refresh_token.as_ref(), "refresh_token cannot be blank")?;
            refresh_login(data, &conn, &client_header.ip).await
        }
        "password" if CONFIG.sso_enabled() && CONFIG.sso_only() => err!("SSO sign-in is required"),
        "password" => {
            check_is_some(data.client_id.as_ref(), "client_id cannot be blank")?;
            check_is_some(data.password.as_ref(), "password cannot be blank")?;
            check_is_some(data.scope.as_ref(), "scope cannot be blank")?;
            check_is_some(data.username.as_ref(), "username cannot be blank")?;

            check_is_some(data.device_identifier.as_ref(), "device_identifier cannot be blank")?;
            check_is_some(data.device_name.as_ref(), "device_name cannot be blank")?;
            check_is_some(data.device_type.as_ref(), "device_type cannot be blank")?;

            password_login(data, &mut user_id, &conn, &client_header.ip).await
        }
        "client_credentials" => {
            check_is_some(data.client_id.as_ref(), "client_id cannot be blank")?;
            check_is_some(data.client_secret.as_ref(), "client_secret cannot be blank")?;
            check_is_some(data.scope.as_ref(), "scope cannot be blank")?;

            api_key_login(data, &mut user_id, &conn, &client_header.ip).await
        }
        "authorization_code" if CONFIG.sso_enabled() => {
            check_is_some(data.client_id.as_ref(), "client_id cannot be blank")?;
            check_is_some(data.code.as_ref(), "code cannot be blank")?;
            check_is_some(data.code_verifier.as_ref(), "code verifier cannot be blank")?;

            check_is_some(data.device_identifier.as_ref(), "device_identifier cannot be blank")?;
            check_is_some(data.device_name.as_ref(), "device_name cannot be blank")?;
            check_is_some(data.device_type.as_ref(), "device_type cannot be blank")?;

            sso_login(data, &mut user_id, &conn, &client_header.ip).await
        }
        "authorization_code" => err!("SSO sign-in is not available"),
        "send_access" => {
            crate::ratelimit::check_limit_unauthenticated(&client_header.ip.ip)?;
            check_is_some(data.client_id.as_ref(), "client_id cannot be blank")?;
            check_is_some(data.send_id.as_ref(), "send_id cannot be blank")?;

            let tokens = auth::SendTokens::generate_tokens(
                data.send_id.as_ref().unwrap(),
                data.password_hash_b64,
                &client_header.ip,
                &conn,
            )
            .await?;
            Ok(Json(tokens.to_json()))
        }
        t => err!("Invalid type", t),
    };

    if let Some(user_id) = user_id {
        match &login_result {
            Ok(_) => {
                log_user_event(
                    EventType::UserLoggedIn,
                    &user_id,
                    client_header.device_type,
                    &client_header.ip.ip,
                    &conn,
                )
                .await;
            }
            Err(e) => {
                if let Some(ev) = e.get_event() {
                    log_user_event(ev.event, &user_id, client_header.device_type, &client_header.ip.ip, &conn).await;
                }
            }
        }
    }

    login_result
}

async fn refresh_login(data: ConnectData, conn: &DbConn, ip: &ClientIp) -> JsonResult {
    // When a refresh token is invalid or missing we need to respond with an HTTP BadRequest (400)
    // It also needs to return a json which holds at least a key `error` with the value `invalid_grant`
    // See the link below for details
    // https://github.com/bitwarden/clients/blob/2ee158e720a5e7dbe3641caf80b569e97a1dd91b/libs/common/src/services/api.service.ts#L1786-L1797

    let Some(refresh_token) = data.refresh_token else {
        err_json!(json!({"error": "invalid_grant"}), "Missing refresh_token")
    };

    // ---
    // Disabled this variable, it was used to generate the JWT
    // Because this might get used in the future, and is add by the Bitwarden Server, lets keep it, but then commented out
    // See: https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/issues/4156
    // ---
    // let members = Membership::find_confirmed_by_user(&user.uuid, conn).await;
    match auth::refresh_tokens(ip, &refresh_token, data.client_id, conn).await {
        Err(err) => {
            err_json!(
                json!({"error": "invalid_grant"}),
                format!("Unable to refresh login credentials: {}", err.message())
            )
        }
        Ok((mut device, auth_tokens)) => {
            // Save to update `device.updated_at` to track usage and toggle new status
            device.save_activity(conn).await?;

            let result = json!({
                "refresh_token": auth_tokens.refresh_token(),
                "access_token": auth_tokens.access_token(),
                "expires_in": auth_tokens.expires_in(),
                "token_type": "Bearer",
                "scope": auth_tokens.scope(),
            });

            Ok(Json(result))
        }
    }
}

// After exchanging the code we need to check first if 2FA is needed before continuing
async fn sso_login(data: ConnectData, user_id: &mut Option<UserId>, conn: &DbConn, ip: &ClientIp) -> JsonResult {
    AuthMethod::Sso.check_scope(data.scope.as_ref())?;

    // Ratelimit the login
    crate::ratelimit::check_limit_login(&ip.ip)?;

    let (code, code_verifier) = match (data.code.as_ref(), data.code_verifier.as_ref()) {
        (None, _) => err!(
            "Got no code in OIDC data",
            ErrorEvent {
                event: EventType::UserFailedLogIn
            }
        ),
        (_, None) => err!(
            "Got no code verifier in OIDC data",
            ErrorEvent {
                event: EventType::UserFailedLogIn
            }
        ),
        (Some(code), Some(code_verifier)) => (code, code_verifier.clone()),
    };

    let (sso_auth, user_infos) = sso::exchange_code(code, code_verifier, conn).await?;
    let user_with_sso = match SsoUser::find_by_identifier(&user_infos.identifier, conn).await {
        None => match SsoUser::find_by_mail(&user_infos.email, conn).await {
            None => None,
            Some((user, Some(_))) => {
                error!(
                    "Login failure ({}), existing SSO user ({}) with same email ({})",
                    user_infos.identifier, user.uuid, user.email
                );
                err_silent!(
                    "Existing SSO user with same email",
                    ErrorEvent {
                        event: EventType::UserFailedLogIn
                    }
                )
            }
            Some((user, None))
                if user.private_key.is_none()
                    && !CONFIG.sso_signups_allowed()
                    && !CONFIG.is_email_domain_allowed(&user.email)
                    && !CONFIG.mail_enabled()
                    && Invitation::find_by_mail(&user.email, conn).await.is_none() =>
            {
                error!(
                    "Login failure ({}), no invitation with email ({}) was found",
                    user_infos.identifier, user.email
                );
                err_silent!(
                    "Missing invitation",
                    ErrorEvent {
                        event: EventType::UserFailedLogIn
                    }
                )
            }
            Some((user, None)) if user.private_key.is_some() && !CONFIG.sso_signups_match_email() => {
                error!(
                    "Login failure ({}), existing non SSO user ({}) with same email ({}) and association is disabled",
                    user_infos.identifier, user.uuid, user.email
                );
                err_silent!(
                    "Existing non SSO user with same email",
                    ErrorEvent {
                        event: EventType::UserFailedLogIn
                    }
                )
            }
            Some((user, None)) => match user_infos.email_verified {
                None if !CONFIG.sso_allow_unknown_email_verification() => {
                    error!(
                        "Login failure ({}), existing non SSO user ({}) with same email ({}) and email verification status is unknown",
                        user_infos.identifier, user.uuid, user.email
                    );
                    err_silent!(
                        "Email verification status is unknown",
                        ErrorEvent {
                            event: EventType::UserFailedLogIn
                        }
                    )
                }
                Some(false) => {
                    error!(
                        "Login failure ({}), existing non SSO user ({}) with same email ({}) and email is not verified",
                        user_infos.identifier, user.uuid, user.email
                    );
                    err_silent!(
                        "Email is not verified by the SSO provider",
                        ErrorEvent {
                            event: EventType::UserFailedLogIn
                        }
                    )
                }
                _ => Some((user, None)),
            },
        },
        Some((user, sso_user)) => Some((user, Some(sso_user))),
    };

    let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
    // Will trigger 2FA flow if needed
    let (user, mut device, twofactor_token, sso_user) = match user_with_sso {
        None => {
            if !CONFIG.is_sso_signup_allowed(&user_infos.email) {
                if CONFIG.signups_domains_whitelist().is_empty() {
                    err!(
                        "Signups are disabled. You will need an invitation",
                        ErrorEvent {
                            event: EventType::UserFailedLogIn
                        }
                    );
                }
                err!(
                    "Email domain not allowed",
                    ErrorEvent {
                        event: EventType::UserFailedLogIn
                    }
                );
            }

            match user_infos.email_verified {
                None if !CONFIG.sso_allow_unknown_email_verification() => err!(
                    "Your provider does not send email verification status.\n\
                    You will need to change the server configuration (check `SSO_ALLOW_UNKNOWN_EMAIL_VERIFICATION`) to log in.",
                    ErrorEvent {
                        event: EventType::UserFailedLogIn
                    }
                ),
                Some(false) => err!(
                    "You need to verify your email with your provider before you can log in",
                    ErrorEvent {
                        event: EventType::UserFailedLogIn
                    }
                ),
                _ => (),
            }

            let mut user = User::new(&user_infos.email, user_infos.user_name.clone());
            user.verified_at = Some(now);
            user.save(conn).await?;

            let device = get_device(&data, conn, &user).await?;

            (user, device, None, None)
        }
        Some((user, _)) if !user.enabled => {
            err!(
                "This user has been disabled",
                format!("IP: {}. Username: {}.", ip.ip, user.email),
                ErrorEvent {
                    event: EventType::UserFailedLogIn
                }
            )
        }
        Some((mut user, sso_user)) => {
            let mut device = get_device(&data, conn, &user).await?;

            let twofactor_token = twofactor_auth(&mut user, &data, &mut device, ip, conn).await?;

            if user.private_key.is_none() {
                // User was invited a stub was created
                user.verified_at = Some(now);
                if let Some(ref user_name) = user_infos.user_name {
                    user.name = user_name.clone();
                }

                user.save(conn).await?;
            }

            if user.email != user_infos.email {
                if CONFIG.mail_enabled() {
                    mail::send_sso_change_email(&user_infos.email).await?;
                }
                info!("User {} email changed in SSO provider from {} to {}", user.uuid, user.email, user_infos.email);
            }

            (user, device, twofactor_token, sso_user)
        }
    };

    // Set the user_uuid here to be passed back used for event logging.
    *user_id = Some(user.uuid.clone());

    // We passed 2FA get auth tokens
    let auth_tokens = sso::redeem(&device, &user, data.client_id, sso_user, sso_auth, user_infos, conn).await?;

    authenticated_response(&user, &mut device, auth_tokens, twofactor_token, true, conn, ip).await
}

async fn password_login(data: ConnectData, user_id: &mut Option<UserId>, conn: &DbConn, ip: &ClientIp) -> JsonResult {
    // Validate scope
    AuthMethod::Password.check_scope(data.scope.as_ref())?;

    // Ratelimit the login
    crate::ratelimit::check_limit_login(&ip.ip)?;

    // Get the user
    let username = data.username.as_ref().unwrap().trim();
    let log_username = username.escape_debug();
    let Some(mut user) = User::find_by_mail(username, conn).await else {
        err!("Username or password is incorrect. Try again", format!("IP: {}. Username: {log_username}.", ip.ip))
    };

    // Set the user_id here to be passed back used for event logging.
    *user_id = Some(user.uuid.clone());

    let password = data.password.as_ref().unwrap();

    // If we get an auth request, we don't check the user's password, but the access code of the auth request
    if let Some(ref auth_request_id) = data.auth_request {
        let Some(auth_request) = AuthRequest::find_by_uuid_and_user(auth_request_id, &user.uuid, conn).await else {
            err!(
                "Auth request not found. Try again.",
                format!("IP: {}. Username: {log_username}.", ip.ip),
                ErrorEvent {
                    event: EventType::UserFailedLogIn,
                }
            )
        };

        let expiration_time = auth_request.creation_date + chrono::Duration::minutes(5);
        let request_expired = Utc::now().naive_utc() >= expiration_time;

        if auth_request.user_uuid != user.uuid
            || !auth_request.approved.unwrap_or(false)
            || auth_request.authentication_date.is_some()
            || request_expired
            || ip.ip.to_string() != auth_request.request_ip
            || !auth_request.check_access_code(password)
        {
            err!(
                "Username or access code is incorrect. Try again",
                format!("IP: {}. Username: {log_username}.", ip.ip),
                ErrorEvent {
                    event: EventType::UserFailedLogIn,
                }
            )
        }
    } else if !user.check_valid_password(password) {
        err!(
            "Username or password is incorrect. Try again",
            format!("IP: {}. Username: {log_username}.", ip.ip),
            ErrorEvent {
                event: EventType::UserFailedLogIn,
            }
        )
    }

    // Check if the user is disabled
    if !user.enabled {
        err!(
            "This user has been disabled",
            format!("IP: {}. Username: {log_username}.", ip.ip),
            ErrorEvent {
                event: EventType::UserFailedLogIn
            }
        )
    }

    // Change the KDF Iterations (only when not logging in with an auth request)
    if data.auth_request.is_none() {
        kdf_upgrade(&mut user, password, conn).await?;
    }

    let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();

    if user.verified_at.is_none() && CONFIG.mail_enabled() && CONFIG.signups_verify() {
        if user.last_verifying_at.is_none()
            || now.signed_duration_since(user.last_verifying_at.unwrap()).num_seconds()
                > i64::from(CONFIG.signups_verify_resend_time())
        {
            let resend_limit = i32::from(CONFIG.signups_verify_resend_limit());
            if resend_limit == 0 || user.login_verify_count < resend_limit {
                // We want to send another email verification if we require signups to verify
                // their email address, and we haven't sent them a reminder in a while...
                user.last_verifying_at = Some(now);
                user.login_verify_count += 1;

                if let Err(e) = user.save(conn).await {
                    error!("Error updating user: {e:#?}");
                }

                if let Err(e) = mail::send_verify_email(&user.email, &user.uuid).await {
                    error!("Error auto-sending email verification email: {e:#?}");
                }
            }
        }

        // We still want the login to fail until they actually verified the email address
        err!(
            "Please verify your email before trying again.",
            format!("IP: {}. Username: {log_username}.", ip.ip),
            ErrorEvent {
                event: EventType::UserFailedLogIn
            }
        )
    }

    let mut device = get_device(&data, conn, &user).await?;

    let twofactor_token = twofactor_auth(&mut user, &data, &mut device, ip, conn).await?;

    // Like upstream, an auth request can be used for one login only. Marked after 2FA so a 2FA prompt doesn't use it up.
    if let Some(ref auth_request_id) = data.auth_request
        && !AuthRequest::set_authentication_date(auth_request_id, conn).await?
    {
        err!(
            "Username or access code is incorrect. Try again",
            format!("IP: {}. Username: {log_username}.", ip.ip),
            ErrorEvent {
                event: EventType::UserFailedLogIn,
            }
        )
    }

    let auth_tokens = auth::AuthTokens::new(&device, &user, AuthMethod::Password, data.client_id);

    authenticated_response(&user, &mut device, auth_tokens, twofactor_token, false, conn, ip).await
}

/// Whether the account creation the clients run when nothing else is on offer can succeed here.
///
/// A client that gets the trusted device options, but neither a master password nor an approval an
/// administrator could give, decides it is looking at a fresh account and walks it through creation:
/// generate the account keys and post them, enrol into the account recovery of the organization behind
/// the SSO login, then trust the device. Every one of those has to be able to go through: if enrolment
/// is refused the keys are already written, and the next login fails at posting them a second time,
/// leaving an account that can never be unlocked at all.
///
/// So the same conditions the enrolment endpoint enforces are checked here, before the client has
/// written anything. Withholding the options instead sends it to setting a master password, which works
/// and leaves the door to trusted devices open for the next login.
async fn account_creation_can_succeed(user: &User, conn: &DbConn) -> bool {
    // `POST /accounts/keys` refuses to replace the keys of an account that has them, and the
    // clients post a freshly generated pair without looking.
    if user.private_key.is_some() || user.public_key.is_some() {
        return false;
    }

    // The organization the client enrols into is the one `GET /organizations/<identifier>/auto-enroll-status`
    // hands it, so ask the same question here.
    let Some(membership) = Membership::find_main_user_org(&user.uuid, conn).await else {
        return false;
    };

    // That lookup only rules out the `Revoked` status itself, which revoking never actually writes: it
    // shifts the status out of the active range instead, so a revoked membership comes back from it like
    // any other. The enrolment endpoint runs behind `OrgMemberHeaders` and turns exactly those away.
    if !membership.is_active() {
        return false;
    }

    // What `check_reset_password_applicable` demands of that organization.
    if !CONFIG.mail_enabled() {
        return false;
    }
    if !OrgPolicy::find_by_org_and_type(&membership.org_uuid, OrgPolicyType::ResetPassword, conn)
        .await
        .is_some_and(|policy| policy.enabled)
    {
        return false;
    }

    // Enrolling wraps the user key for the organization, so it needs its public key.
    Organization::find_by_uuid(&membership.org_uuid, conn)
        .await
        .is_some_and(|org| org.public_key.is_some_and(|key| !key.is_empty()))
}

/// The ways an account could get through the trusted device flow, which is what decides whether
/// offering it leads anywhere.
#[expect(
    clippy::struct_excessive_bools,
    reason = "Four independent facts about one account, not a state that could be an enum"
)]
struct TrustedDeviceWaysIn {
    /// This device already holds the keys, so it unlocks without asking anyone.
    device_is_trusted: bool,
    /// A master password to fall back on.
    has_master_password: bool,
    /// An administrator of an organization who could let a new device in, which they can only do
    /// once the member enrolled into account recovery.
    has_admin_approval: bool,
    /// Nothing set up yet, but the account creation the clients run in that case would go through.
    can_create_account: bool,
}

impl TrustedDeviceWaysIn {
    /// Whether the trusted device options belong in a login response, and in which of their two roles.
    ///
    /// `Some(true)` means they are only there to walk a user without a master password off the feature
    /// after it was switched off; `None` means they are withheld, because nothing the client could do
    /// with them would work. The order mirrors how the clients read them: a trusted device unlocks
    /// straight away, otherwise an administrator to ask or a master password to type is offered, and only
    /// when there is neither does the client try to create a fresh account.
    fn offer(&self, enabled: bool) -> Option<bool> {
        // Once the feature is switched off again, a user without a master password would be locked out
        // of their own vault. Keep telling their still trusted devices about it so their client can walk
        // them through setting one while they can still unlock.
        let offboarding = !enabled && self.offboarding_candidate();
        if !(enabled || offboarding) {
            return None;
        }

        let leads_somewhere =
            self.device_is_trusted || self.has_admin_approval || self.has_master_password || self.can_create_account;
        leads_somewhere.then_some(offboarding)
    }

    /// A user who is still on a trusted device and has no master password to fall back on, and so
    /// has to be told when the feature goes away.
    fn offboarding_candidate(&self) -> bool {
        self.device_is_trusted && !self.has_master_password
    }
}

/// Trusted device encryption ("passwordless SSO"): instead of deriving the user key from a master
/// password, the client keeps a copy of it on the device, wrapped for a key pair that the device
/// generated. Its presence in the response is what makes the clients offer the flow at all.
///
/// Upstream ties this to the SSO configuration of an organization; Vaultwarden configures SSO for the
/// whole server, so `SSO_TRUSTED_DEVICE_ENCRYPTION` decides it here. Either way it stays an SSO feature,
/// a password login never gets these options.
/// https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/main/src/Identity/IdentityServer/UserDecryptionOptionsBuilder.cs
async fn trusted_device_option(user: &User, device: &Device, conn: &DbConn) -> Option<Value> {
    let enabled = CONFIG.sso_trusted_device_encryption();

    let mut ways_in = TrustedDeviceWaysIn {
        device_is_trusted: device.is_trusted(),
        has_master_password: !user.password_hash.is_empty(),
        has_admin_approval: false,
        can_create_account: false,
    };

    // Answered ahead of everything else so a server that does not offer trusted devices, and has no
    // user left on them, does no work for the feature at all.
    if !(enabled || ways_in.offboarding_candidate()) {
        return None;
    }

    let memberships = Membership::find_by_user(&user.uuid, conn).await;

    // An admin can only take over the approval once the member handed them a key to work with, which is
    // what enrolling into account recovery does. The same condition the request itself is created and
    // answered under, so this does not announce a way out that would be refused the moment it is taken.
    ways_in.has_admin_approval = memberships.iter().any(Membership::can_use_admin_approval);

    // Only worth asking when nothing cheaper already lets the client in.
    if !(ways_in.device_is_trusted || ways_in.has_admin_approval || ways_in.has_master_password) {
        ways_in.can_create_account = account_creation_can_succeed(user, conn).await;
    }

    let offboarding = ways_in.offer(enabled)?;

    // Any other device of this user that could show an approval prompt. The user unlocks a new
    // device from one of these, or with the master password if they have one.
    let has_login_approving_device = Device::find_by_user(&user.uuid, conn)
        .await
        .iter()
        .any(|other| other.uuid != device.uuid && DeviceType::from_i32(other.atype).can_approve_login_requests());

    // Whether the user is on the answering side of that. The clients use it to push someone who could
    // approve others, but has no master password themselves, into setting one. Every active membership
    // counts, not only a confirmed one: an administrator provisioned by this very login holds the role
    // before anybody has confirmed them. See `has_manage_reset_password_role_for_tde`.
    let has_manage_reset_password_permission =
        memberships.iter().any(Membership::has_manage_reset_password_role_for_tde);

    Some(json!({
        "HasAdminApproval": ways_in.has_admin_approval,
        "HasLoginApprovingDevice": has_login_approving_device,
        "HasManageResetPasswordPermission": has_manage_reset_password_permission,
        "IsTdeOffboarding": offboarding,
        "EncryptedPrivateKey": device.trusted_private_key(),
        "EncryptedUserKey": device.trusted_user_key(),
        "Object": "trustedDeviceUserDecryptionOption"
    }))
}

async fn authenticated_response(
    user: &User,
    device: &mut Device,
    auth_tokens: auth::AuthTokens,
    twofactor_token: Option<String>,
    sso_login: bool,
    conn: &DbConn,
    ip: &ClientIp,
) -> JsonResult {
    if CONFIG.mail_enabled() && device.is_new() {
        let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
        if let Err(e) = mail::send_new_device_logged_in(&user.email, &ip.ip.to_string(), &now, device).await {
            error!("Error sending new device email: {e:#?}");

            if CONFIG.require_device_email() {
                err!(
                    "Could not send login notification email. Please contact your administrator.",
                    ErrorEvent {
                        event: EventType::UserFailedLogIn
                    }
                )
            }
        }
    }

    // register push device
    if !device.is_new() {
        register_push_device(device, conn).await?;
    }

    // Save to update `device.updated_at` to track usage and toggle new status
    device.save_activity(conn).await?;

    let master_password_policy = identity_master_password_policy(user, conn).await;

    let has_master_password = !user.password_hash.is_empty();
    let master_password_unlock = if has_master_password {
        json!({
            "Kdf": {
                "KdfType": user.client_kdf_type,
                "Iterations": user.client_kdf_iter,
                "Memory": user.client_kdf_memory,
                "Parallelism": user.client_kdf_parallelism
            },
            // This field is named inconsistently and will be removed and replaced by the "wrapped" variant in the apps.
            // https://github.com/bitwarden/android/blob/release/2025.12-rc41/network/src/main/kotlin/com/bitwarden/network/model/MasterPasswordUnlockDataJson.kt#L22-L26
            "MasterKeyEncryptedUserKey": user.akey,
            "MasterKeyWrappedUserKey": user.akey,
            "Salt": user.email
        })
    } else {
        Value::Null
    };

    let account_keys = if user.private_key.is_some() {
        json!({
            "publicKeyEncryptionKeyPair": {
                "wrappedPrivateKey": user.private_key,
                "publicKey": user.public_key,
                "Object": "publicKeyEncryptionKeyPair"
            },
            "Object": "privateKeys"
        })
    } else {
        Value::Null
    };

    let mut user_decryption_options = json!({
        "HasMasterPassword": has_master_password,
        "MasterPasswordUnlock": master_password_unlock,
        "Object": "userDecryptionOptions"
    });

    if sso_login && let Some(option) = trusted_device_option(user, device, conn).await {
        user_decryption_options["TrustedDeviceOption"] = option;
    }

    let mut result = json!({
        "access_token": auth_tokens.access_token(),
        "expires_in": auth_tokens.expires_in(),
        "token_type": "Bearer",
        "refresh_token": auth_tokens.refresh_token(),
        "PrivateKey": user.private_key,
        "Kdf": user.client_kdf_type,
        "KdfIterations": user.client_kdf_iter,
        "KdfMemory": user.client_kdf_memory,
        "KdfParallelism": user.client_kdf_parallelism,
        "ForcePasswordReset": false,
        "MasterPasswordPolicy": master_password_policy,
        "scope": auth_tokens.scope(),
        "AccountKeys": account_keys,
        "UserDecryptionOptions": user_decryption_options,
    });

    if !user.akey.is_empty() {
        result["Key"] = Value::String(user.akey.clone());
    }

    if let Some(token) = twofactor_token {
        result["TwoFactorToken"] = Value::String(token);
    }

    info!("User {} logged in successfully. IP: {}", user.email, ip.ip);
    Ok(Json(result))
}

async fn api_key_login(data: ConnectData, user_id: &mut Option<UserId>, conn: &DbConn, ip: &ClientIp) -> JsonResult {
    // Ratelimit the login
    crate::ratelimit::check_limit_login(&ip.ip)?;

    // Validate scope
    match data.scope.as_ref() {
        Some(scope) if scope == &AuthMethod::UserApiKey.scope() => {
            // Like upstream, only the user API key logs in a device
            check_is_some(data.device_identifier.as_ref(), "device_identifier cannot be blank")?;
            check_is_some(data.device_name.as_ref(), "device_name cannot be blank")?;
            check_is_some(data.device_type.as_ref(), "device_type cannot be blank")?;

            user_api_key_login(data, user_id, conn, ip).await
        }
        Some(scope) if scope == &AuthMethod::OrgApiKey.scope() => organization_api_key_login(data, conn, ip).await,
        _ => err!("Scope not supported"),
    }
}

async fn user_api_key_login(
    data: ConnectData,
    user_id: &mut Option<UserId>,
    conn: &DbConn,
    ip: &ClientIp,
) -> JsonResult {
    // Get the user via the client_id
    let client_id = data.client_id.as_ref().unwrap();
    let Some(client_user_id) = client_id.strip_prefix("user.") else {
        err!("Malformed client_id", format!("IP: {}.", ip.ip))
    };
    let client_user_id: UserId = client_user_id.into();
    let Some(user) = User::find_by_uuid(&client_user_id, conn).await else {
        err!("Invalid client_id", format!("IP: {}.", ip.ip))
    };

    // Set the user_id here to be passed back used for event logging.
    *user_id = Some(user.uuid.clone());

    // Check if the user is disabled
    if !user.enabled {
        err!(
            "This user has been disabled (API key login)",
            format!("IP: {}. Username: {}.", ip.ip, user.email),
            ErrorEvent {
                event: EventType::UserFailedLogIn
            }
        )
    }

    // Check API key. Note that API key logins bypass 2FA.
    let client_secret = data.client_secret.as_ref().unwrap();
    if !user.check_valid_api_key(client_secret) {
        err!(
            "Incorrect client_secret",
            format!("IP: {}. Username: {}.", ip.ip, user.email),
            ErrorEvent {
                event: EventType::UserFailedLogIn
            }
        )
    }

    let mut device = get_device(&data, conn, &user).await?;

    if CONFIG.mail_enabled() && device.is_new() {
        let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
        if let Err(e) = mail::send_new_device_logged_in(&user.email, &ip.ip.to_string(), &now, &device).await {
            error!("Error sending new device email: {e:#?}");

            if CONFIG.require_device_email() {
                err!(
                    "Could not send login notification email. Please contact your administrator.",
                    ErrorEvent {
                        event: EventType::UserFailedLogIn
                    }
                )
            }
        }
    }

    // ---
    // Disabled this variable, it was used to generate the JWT
    // Because this might get used in the future, and is add by the Bitwarden Server, lets keep it, but then commented out
    // See: https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/issues/4156
    // ---
    // let orgs = Membership::find_confirmed_by_user(&user.uuid, conn).await;
    let access_claims = auth::LoginJwtClaims::default(&device, &user, &AuthMethod::UserApiKey, data.client_id);

    // Save to update `device.updated_at` to track usage and toggle new status
    device.save_activity(conn).await?;

    info!("User {} logged in successfully via API key. IP: {}", user.email, ip.ip);

    let has_master_password = !user.password_hash.is_empty();
    let master_password_unlock = if has_master_password {
        json!({
            "Kdf": {
                "KdfType": user.client_kdf_type,
                "Iterations": user.client_kdf_iter,
                "Memory": user.client_kdf_memory,
                "Parallelism": user.client_kdf_parallelism
            },
            // This field is named inconsistently and will be removed and replaced by the "wrapped" variant in the apps.
            // https://github.com/bitwarden/android/blob/release/2025.12-rc41/network/src/main/kotlin/com/bitwarden/network/model/MasterPasswordUnlockDataJson.kt#L22-L26
            "MasterKeyEncryptedUserKey": user.akey,
            "MasterKeyWrappedUserKey": user.akey,
            "Salt": user.email
        })
    } else {
        Value::Null
    };

    let account_keys = if user.private_key.is_some() {
        json!({
            "publicKeyEncryptionKeyPair": {
                "wrappedPrivateKey": user.private_key,
                "publicKey": user.public_key,
                "Object": "publicKeyEncryptionKeyPair"
            },
            "Object": "privateKeys"
        })
    } else {
        Value::Null
    };

    // Note: No refresh_token is returned. The CLI just repeats the
    // client_credentials login flow when the existing token expires.
    let result = json!({
        "access_token": access_claims.token(),
        "expires_in": access_claims.expires_in(),
        "token_type": "Bearer",
        "Key": user.akey,
        "PrivateKey": user.private_key,

        "Kdf": user.client_kdf_type,
        "KdfIterations": user.client_kdf_iter,
        "KdfMemory": user.client_kdf_memory,
        "KdfParallelism": user.client_kdf_parallelism,
        "ForcePasswordReset": false,
        "scope": AuthMethod::UserApiKey.scope(),
        "AccountKeys": account_keys,
        "UserDecryptionOptions": {
            "HasMasterPassword": has_master_password,
            "MasterPasswordUnlock": master_password_unlock,
            "Object": "userDecryptionOptions"
        },
    });

    Ok(Json(result))
}

async fn organization_api_key_login(data: ConnectData, conn: &DbConn, ip: &ClientIp) -> JsonResult {
    // Get the org via the client_id
    let client_id = data.client_id.as_ref().unwrap();
    let Some(org_id) = client_id.strip_prefix("organization.") else {
        err!("Malformed client_id", format!("IP: {}.", ip.ip))
    };
    let org_id: OrganizationId = org_id.to_owned().into();
    let Some(org_api_key) = OrganizationApiKey::find_by_org_uuid(&org_id, conn).await else {
        err!("Invalid client_id", format!("IP: {}.", ip.ip))
    };

    // Check API key.
    let client_secret = data.client_secret.as_ref().unwrap();
    if !org_api_key.check_valid_api_key(client_secret) {
        err!("Incorrect client_secret", format!("IP: {}. Organization: {}.", ip.ip, org_api_key.org_uuid))
    }

    let claim = generate_organization_api_key_login_claims(org_api_key.uuid, org_api_key.org_uuid);
    let access_token = auth::encode_jwt(&claim);

    Ok(Json(json!({
        "access_token": access_token,
        "expires_in": 3600,
        "token_type": "Bearer",
        "scope": AuthMethod::OrgApiKey.scope(),
    })))
}

/// Retrieves an existing device or creates a new device from ConnectData and the User
async fn get_device(data: &ConnectData, conn: &DbConn, user: &User) -> ApiResult<Device> {
    // On iOS, device_type sends "iOS", on others it sends a number
    // When unknown or unable to parse, return 14, which is 'Unknown Browser'
    let device_type = util::try_parse_string(data.device_type.as_ref()).unwrap_or(14);
    let device_id = data.device_identifier.clone().expect("No device id provided");
    let device_name = data.device_name.clone().expect("No device name provided");

    // Find device or create new
    if let Some(device) = Device::find_by_uuid_and_user(&device_id, &user.uuid, conn).await {
        Ok(device)
    } else {
        let mut device = Device::new(device_id, user.uuid.clone(), device_name, device_type);
        // save device without updating `device.updated_at`
        device.save(false, conn).await?;
        Ok(device)
    }
}

async fn twofactor_auth(
    user: &mut User,
    data: &ConnectData,
    device: &mut Device,
    ip: &ClientIp,
    conn: &DbConn,
) -> ApiResult<Option<String>> {
    let twofactors = TwoFactor::find_by_user(&user.uuid, conn).await;

    // No twofactor token if twofactor is disabled
    if twofactors.is_empty() {
        enforce_2fa_policy(user, &user.uuid, device.atype, &ip.ip, conn).await?;
        return Ok(None);
    }

    TwoFactorIncomplete::mark_incomplete(&user.uuid, &device.uuid, &device.name, device.atype, ip, conn).await?;

    let twofactor_ids: Vec<_> = twofactors
        .iter()
        .filter_map(|tf| {
            let provider_type = TwoFactorType::from_i32(tf.atype)?;
            (tf.enabled && is_twofactor_provider_usable(&provider_type, Some(&tf.data))).then_some(tf.atype)
        })
        .collect();
    if twofactor_ids.is_empty() {
        err!("No enabled and usable two factor providers are available for this account")
    }

    let selected_id = data.two_factor_provider.unwrap_or(twofactor_ids[0]); // If we aren't given a two factor provider, assume the first one
    // Ignore Remember and RecoveryCode Types during this check, these are special
    if ![TwoFactorType::Remember as i32, TwoFactorType::RecoveryCode as i32].contains(&selected_id)
        && !twofactor_ids.contains(&selected_id)
    {
        err_json!(json_err_twofactor(&twofactor_ids, user, data, conn).await?, "Invalid two factor provider")
    }

    // Like upstream, a blank token counts as not provided
    let Some(twofactor_code) = data.two_factor_token.as_deref().filter(|t| !t.trim().is_empty()) else {
        err_json!(json_err_twofactor(&twofactor_ids, user, data, conn).await?, "2FA token not provided")
    };

    let selected_twofactor = twofactors.into_iter().find(|tf| tf.atype == selected_id && tf.enabled);

    let selected_data = selected_data(selected_twofactor);

    match TwoFactorType::from_i32(selected_id) {
        Some(TwoFactorType::Authenticator) => {
            authenticator::validate_totp_code_str(&user.uuid, twofactor_code, &selected_data?, ip, conn).await?;
        }
        Some(TwoFactorType::Webauthn) => webauthn::validate_webauthn_login(&user.uuid, twofactor_code, conn).await?,
        Some(TwoFactorType::YubiKey) => yubikey::validate_yubikey_login(twofactor_code, &selected_data?).await?,
        Some(TwoFactorType::Duo) => {
            duo_oidc::validate_duo_login(
                &user.email,
                twofactor_code,
                data.client_id.as_ref().unwrap(),
                data.device_identifier.as_ref().unwrap(),
                conn,
            )
            .await?;
        }
        Some(TwoFactorType::Email) => {
            email::validate_email_code_str(&user.uuid, twofactor_code, &selected_data?, &ip.ip, conn).await?;
        }
        Some(TwoFactorType::Remember) => {
            match device.twofactor_remember {
                // When a 2FA Remember token is used, check and validate this JWT token, if it is valid, just continue
                // If it is invalid we need to trigger the 2FA Login prompt
                Some(ref token)
                    if !CONFIG.disable_2fa_remember()
                        && (crypto::ct_eq(token, twofactor_code)
                            && auth::decode_2fa_remember(twofactor_code)
                                .is_ok_and(|t| t.sub == device.uuid && t.user_uuid == user.uuid)) => {}
                _ => {
                    // Always delete the current twofactor remember token here if it exists
                    if device.twofactor_remember.is_some() {
                        device.delete_twofactor_remember();
                        // We need to save here, since we send a err_json!() which prevents saving `device` at a later stage
                        device.save_activity(conn).await?;
                    }
                    err_json!(
                        json_err_twofactor(&twofactor_ids, user, data, conn).await?,
                        "2FA Remember token not provided or expired"
                    )
                }
            }
        }
        Some(TwoFactorType::RecoveryCode) => {
            // Like upstream, spaces and case don't matter
            let recovery_code = twofactor_code.replace(' ', "").trim().to_lowercase();
            if !user.check_valid_recovery_code(&recovery_code) {
                err!(
                    "Two-step token is invalid. Try again.",
                    ErrorEvent {
                        event: EventType::UserFailedLogIn2fa
                    }
                )
            }

            // Remove all twofactors from the user
            TwoFactor::delete_all_by_user(&user.uuid, conn).await?;

            // No device may keep skipping 2FA once every second factor is gone.
            // `device` is cleared in memory too, since saving it later would restore its token.
            Device::clear_twofactor_remember_by_user(&user.uuid, conn).await?;
            device.delete_twofactor_remember();

            enforce_2fa_policy(user, &user.uuid, device.atype, &ip.ip, conn).await?;

            log_user_event(EventType::UserRecovered2fa, &user.uuid, device.atype, &ip.ip, conn).await;

            if CONFIG.mail_enabled()
                && let Err(e) =
                    mail::send_recover_twofactor(&user.email, &ip.ip.to_string(), &Utc::now().naive_utc()).await
            {
                error!("Error sending two-step login recovered email: {e:#?}");
            }

            // Remove the recovery code, not needed without twofactors
            user.totp_recover = None;
            user.save(conn).await?;
        }
        _ => err!(
            "Invalid two factor provider",
            ErrorEvent {
                event: EventType::UserFailedLogIn2fa
            }
        ),
    }

    TwoFactorIncomplete::mark_complete(&user.uuid, &device.uuid, conn).await?;

    let remember = data.two_factor_remember.unwrap_or(0);
    let two_factor = if !CONFIG.disable_2fa_remember() && remember == 1 {
        Some(device.refresh_twofactor_remember())
    } else {
        None
    };
    Ok(two_factor)
}

fn selected_data(tf: Option<TwoFactor>) -> ApiResult<String> {
    tf.map(|t| t.data).map_res("Two factor doesn't exist")
}

async fn json_err_twofactor(providers: &[i32], user: &User, data: &ConnectData, conn: &DbConn) -> ApiResult<Value> {
    let user_id = &user.uuid;
    let mut result = json!({
        "error" : "invalid_grant",
        "error_description" : "Two factor required.",
        "TwoFactorProviders" : providers.iter().map(ToString::to_string).collect::<Vec<String>>(),
        "TwoFactorProviders2" : {}, // { "0" : null }
        "MasterPasswordPolicy": identity_master_password_policy(user, conn).await,
    });

    for provider in providers {
        result["TwoFactorProviders2"][provider.to_string()] = Value::Null;

        match TwoFactorType::from_i32(*provider) {
            Some(TwoFactorType::Webauthn) if CONFIG.is_webauthn_2fa_supported() => {
                let request = webauthn::generate_webauthn_login(user_id, conn).await?;
                result["TwoFactorProviders2"][provider.to_string()] = request.0;
            }

            Some(TwoFactorType::Duo) => {
                let auth_url = duo_oidc::get_duo_auth_url(
                    &user.email,
                    data.client_id.as_ref().unwrap(),
                    data.device_identifier.as_ref().unwrap(),
                    conn,
                )
                .await?;

                result["TwoFactorProviders2"][provider.to_string()] = json!({
                    "AuthUrl": auth_url,
                });
            }

            Some(tf_type @ TwoFactorType::YubiKey) => {
                let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, tf_type, conn).await else {
                    err!("No YubiKey devices registered")
                };

                let yubikey_metadata: yubikey::YubikeyMetadata = serde_json::from_str(&twofactor.data)?;

                result["TwoFactorProviders2"][provider.to_string()] = json!({
                    "Nfc": yubikey_metadata.nfc,
                });
            }

            Some(tf_type @ TwoFactorType::Email) => {
                let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, tf_type, conn).await else {
                    err!("No twofactor email registered")
                };

                let email_data = email::EmailTokenData::from_json(&twofactor.data)?;
                result["TwoFactorProviders2"][provider.to_string()] = json!({
                    "Email": email::obscure_email(&email_data.email),
                });
            }

            None
            | Some(
                TwoFactorType::Authenticator
                | TwoFactorType::EmailVerificationChallenge
                | TwoFactorType::OrganizationDuo
                | TwoFactorType::ProtectedActions
                | TwoFactorType::RecoveryCode
                | TwoFactorType::Remember
                | TwoFactorType::U2f
                | TwoFactorType::U2fLoginChallenge
                | TwoFactorType::U2fRegisterChallenge
                | TwoFactorType::Webauthn
                | TwoFactorType::WebauthnLoginChallenge
                | TwoFactorType::WebauthnRegisterChallenge,
            ) => { /* Nothing special to do for these providers */ }
        }
    }

    Ok(result)
}

#[post("/accounts/prelogin", data = "<data>")]
async fn post_prelogin(data: Json<PreloginData>, ip: ClientIp, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
    prelogin(data, ip, conn).await
}

#[post("/accounts/prelogin/password", data = "<data>")]
async fn prelogin_password(data: Json<PreloginData>, ip: ClientIp, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
    prelogin(data, ip, conn).await
}

#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
struct RegisterVerificationData {
    email: String,
    name: Option<String>,
    // receiveMarketingEmails: bool,
}

#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
struct RegisterVerificationEmailClickedData {
    email: String,
    email_verification_token: String,
}

#[derive(rocket::Responder)]
enum RegisterVerificationResponse {
    #[response(status = 204)]
    NoContent(()),
    Token(Json<String>),
    PlainToken(String),
}

// Return JSON only when the client explicitly requests it, otherwise return plain text.
fn accepts_json(accept: Option<&Accept>) -> bool {
    accept.is_some_and(|accept| accept.preferred().media_type() == &MediaType::JSON)
}

#[post("/accounts/register/send-verification-email", data = "<data>")]
async fn register_verification_email(
    data: Json<RegisterVerificationData>,
    accept: Option<&Accept>,
    ip: ClientIp,
    conn: DbConn,
) -> ApiResult<RegisterVerificationResponse> {
    crate::ratelimit::check_limit_unauthenticated(&ip.ip)?;

    let data = data.into_inner();

    // the registration can only continue if signup is allowed or there exists an invitation
    if !(CONFIG.is_signup_allowed(&data.email)
        || (!CONFIG.mail_enabled() && Invitation::find_by_mail(&data.email, &conn).await.is_some()))
    {
        err!("Registration not allowed or user already exists")
    }

    let should_send_mail = CONFIG.mail_enabled() && CONFIG.signups_verify();

    let token_claims = auth::generate_register_verify_claims(data.email.clone(), data.name.clone(), should_send_mail);
    let token = auth::encode_jwt(&token_claims);

    if should_send_mail {
        let user = User::find_by_mail(&data.email, &conn).await;
        if user.as_ref().is_some_and(|u| u.private_key.is_some()) {
            // There is still a timing side channel here in that the code
            // paths that send mail take noticeably longer than ones that don't.
            // Add a randomized sleep to mitigate this somewhat.
            use rand::{RngExt, rngs::SmallRng};
            let mut rng: SmallRng = rand::make_rng();
            let sleep_ms: u64 = rng.random_range(900..=1100);
            tokio::time::sleep(tokio::time::Duration::from_millis(sleep_ms)).await;
        } else {
            mail::send_register_verify_email(&data.email, &token).await?;
        }

        Ok(RegisterVerificationResponse::NoContent(()))
    } else {
        // If email verification is not required, return the token directly
        // the clients will use this token to finish the registration
        Ok(if accepts_json(accept) {
            RegisterVerificationResponse::Token(Json(token))
        } else {
            RegisterVerificationResponse::PlainToken(token)
        })
    }
}

#[post("/accounts/register/verification-email-clicked", data = "<data>")]
async fn register_verification_email_clicked(
    data: Json<RegisterVerificationEmailClickedData>,
    conn: DbConn,
) -> EmptyResult {
    let data = data.into_inner();
    let token_valid = auth::decode_register_verify(&data.email_verification_token)
        .is_ok_and(|claims| claims.verified && claims.sub.eq_ignore_ascii_case(&data.email));
    let user_exists = User::find_by_mail(&data.email, &conn)
        .await
        .is_some_and(|user| !user.password_hash.is_empty() || user.private_key.is_some());

    if !token_valid || user_exists {
        err!("Expired link. Please restart registration or try logging in. You may already have an account")
    }

    Ok(())
}

#[post("/accounts/register/finish", data = "<data>")]
async fn register_finish(data: Json<RegisterData>, ip: ClientIp, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
    crate::ratelimit::check_limit_unauthenticated(&ip.ip)?;
    register(data, conn).await
}

// https://github.com/bitwarden/jslib/blob/master/common/src/models/request/tokenRequest.ts
// https://github.com/bitwarden/mobile/blob/master/src/Core/Models/Request/TokenRequest.cs
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, FromForm)]
struct ConnectData {
    #[field(name = uncased("grant_type"))]
    #[field(name = uncased("granttype"))]
    grant_type: String, // refresh_token, password, client_credentials (API key)

    // Needed for grant_type="refresh_token"
    #[field(name = uncased("refresh_token"))]
    #[field(name = uncased("refreshtoken"))]
    refresh_token: Option<String>,

    // Needed for grant_type = "password" | "client_credentials"
    #[field(name = uncased("client_id"))]
    #[field(name = uncased("clientid"))]
    client_id: Option<String>, // web, cli, desktop, browser, mobile
    #[field(name = uncased("client_secret"))]
    #[field(name = uncased("clientsecret"))]
    client_secret: Option<String>,
    #[field(name = uncased("password"))]
    password: Option<String>,
    #[field(name = uncased("scope"))]
    scope: Option<String>,
    #[field(name = uncased("username"))]
    username: Option<String>,

    #[field(name = uncased("device_identifier"))]
    #[field(name = uncased("deviceidentifier"))]
    device_identifier: Option<DeviceId>,
    #[field(name = uncased("device_name"))]
    #[field(name = uncased("devicename"))]
    device_name: Option<String>,
    #[field(name = uncased("device_type"))]
    #[field(name = uncased("devicetype"))]
    device_type: Option<String>,
    #[allow(unused)]
    #[field(name = uncased("device_push_token"))]
    #[field(name = uncased("devicepushtoken"))]
    _device_push_token: Option<String>, // Unused; mobile device push not yet supported.

    // Needed for two-factor auth
    #[field(name = uncased("two_factor_provider"))]
    #[field(name = uncased("twofactorprovider"))]
    two_factor_provider: Option<i32>,
    #[field(name = uncased("two_factor_token"))]
    #[field(name = uncased("twofactortoken"))]
    two_factor_token: Option<String>,
    #[field(name = uncased("two_factor_remember"))]
    #[field(name = uncased("twofactorremember"))]
    two_factor_remember: Option<i32>,
    #[field(name = uncased("authrequest"))]
    auth_request: Option<AuthRequestId>,

    // Needed for authorization code
    #[field(name = uncased("code"))]
    code: Option<OIDCCode>,
    #[field(name = uncased("code_verifier"))]
    code_verifier: Option<OIDCCodeVerifier>,

    // Needed for send access
    send_id: Option<SendId>,
    password_hash_b64: Option<String>,
}
fn check_is_some<T>(value: Option<&T>, msg: &str) -> EmptyResult {
    if value.is_none() {
        err!(msg)
    }
    Ok(())
}

#[get("/sso/prevalidate")]
fn prevalidate() -> JsonResult {
    if CONFIG.sso_enabled() {
        let sso_token = sso::encode_ssotoken_claims();
        Ok(Json(json!({
            "token": sso_token,
        })))
    } else {
        err!("SSO sign-in is not available")
    }
}

const SSO_BINDING_COOKIE: &str = "VW_SSO_BINDING";

#[get("/connect/oidc-signin?<code>&<state>", rank = 1)]
async fn oidcsignin(code: OIDCCode, state: String, cookies: &CookieJar<'_>, mut conn: DbConn) -> ApiResult<Redirect> {
    oidcsignin_redirect(state, code, None, cookies, &mut conn).await
}

// Bitwarden client appear to only care for code and state
// We save the error in the database and set the encoded state as the code to be able to retrieve them later on
// cf: https://github.com/bitwarden/clients/blob/afd36d290ce18fb0048e0575e7d5a8f78b5dbffc/libs/auth/src/angular/sso/sso.component.ts#L156
#[get("/connect/oidc-signin?<state>&<error>&<error_description>", rank = 2)]
async fn oidcsignin_error(
    state: String,
    error: String,
    error_description: Option<String>,
    cookies: &CookieJar<'_>,
    mut conn: DbConn,
) -> ApiResult<Redirect> {
    oidcsignin_redirect(
        state.clone(),
        state.into(),
        Some(OIDCCodeResponseError {
            error,
            error_description,
        }),
        cookies,
        &mut conn,
    )
    .await
}

// The state was encoded using Base64 to ensure no issue with providers.
// iss and scope parameters are needed for redirection to work on IOS.
// We pass the state as the code to get it back later on.
async fn oidcsignin_redirect(
    base64_state: String,
    code: OIDCCode,
    error: Option<OIDCCodeResponseError>,
    cookies: &CookieJar<'_>,
    conn: &mut DbConn,
) -> ApiResult<Redirect> {
    let state = sso::decode_state(&base64_state)?;

    let Some(mut sso_auth) = SsoAuth::find(&state, conn).await else {
        err!(format!("Cannot retrieve sso_auth for {}", state.escape_debug()))
    };

    // Browser-binding check
    // The cookie was set on /connect/authorize and must come from the same browser that initiated the flow.
    let cookie_value = cookies.get(SSO_BINDING_COOKIE).map(|c| c.value().to_owned());
    let provided_hash = cookie_value.as_deref().map(|v| crypto::sha256_hex(v.as_bytes()));
    match (sso_auth.binding_hash.as_deref(), provided_hash.as_deref()) {
        (Some(expected), Some(actual)) if crypto::ct_eq(expected, actual) => {}
        _ => err!(format!("SSO session binding mismatch for {}", state.escape_debug())),
    }
    cookies
        .remove(Cookie::build(SSO_BINDING_COOKIE).path(format!("{}/identity/connect/", CONFIG.domain_path())).build());

    sso_auth.code_response = Some(code.clone());
    sso_auth.code_response_error = error;
    sso_auth.updated_at = Utc::now().naive_utc();
    sso_auth.save(conn).await?;

    let mut url = match url::Url::parse(&sso_auth.redirect_uri) {
        Ok(url) => url,
        Err(err) => err!(format!("Failed to parse redirect uri ({}): {err}", sso_auth.redirect_uri)),
    };

    url.query_pairs_mut()
        .append_pair("code", &code)
        .append_pair("state", &state)
        .append_pair("scope", &AuthMethod::Sso.scope())
        .append_pair("iss", &CONFIG.domain());

    debug!("Redirection to {url}");

    Ok(Redirect::temporary(String::from(url)))
}

#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, FromForm)]
struct AuthorizeData {
    #[field(name = uncased("client_id"))]
    #[field(name = uncased("clientid"))]
    client_id: String,
    #[field(name = uncased("redirect_uri"))]
    #[field(name = uncased("redirecturi"))]
    redirect_uri: String,
    #[allow(unused)]
    response_type: Option<String>,
    #[allow(unused)]
    scope: Option<String>,
    state: OIDCState,
    code_challenge: OIDCCodeChallenge,
    code_challenge_method: String,
    #[allow(unused)]
    response_mode: Option<String>,
    #[allow(unused)]
    domain_hint: Option<String>,
    #[allow(unused)]
    #[field(name = uncased("ssoToken"))]
    sso_token: Option<String>,
}

// The `redirect_uri` will change depending of the client (web, android, ios ..)
#[get("/connect/authorize?<data..>")]
async fn authorize(data: AuthorizeData, cookies: &CookieJar<'_>, secure: Secure, conn: DbConn) -> ApiResult<Redirect> {
    let AuthorizeData {
        client_id,
        redirect_uri,
        state,
        code_challenge,
        code_challenge_method,
        ..
    } = data;

    if code_challenge_method != "S256" {
        err!("Unsupported code challenge method");
    }

    // Generate browser-binding token. Stored hashed in DB; raw value handed to the browser as a cookie.
    // Validated on /connect/oidc-signin
    let binding_token = data_encoding::BASE64URL_NOPAD.encode(&crypto::get_random_bytes::<32>());
    let binding_hash = crypto::sha256_hex(binding_token.as_bytes());

    let auth_url =
        sso::authorize_url(state, code_challenge, &client_id, &redirect_uri, Some(binding_hash), conn).await?;

    cookies.add(
        Cookie::build((SSO_BINDING_COOKIE, binding_token))
            .path(format!("{}/identity/connect/", CONFIG.domain_path()))
            .max_age(time::Duration::seconds(sso::SSO_AUTH_EXPIRATION.num_seconds()))
            .same_site(SameSite::Lax) // Lax is needed because the IdP runs on a different FQDN
            .http_only(true)
            .secure(secure.https)
            .build(),
    );

    Ok(Redirect::temporary(String::from(auth_url)))
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    /// Withheld wherever nothing the client could do with them would work. Once the feature is switched
    /// off they are only kept for a user left on a trusted device without a master password, so their
    /// client can walk them off the feature while they can still unlock.
    #[test]
    fn the_trusted_device_options_are_offered_where_they_lead_somewhere() {
        // enabled, device trusted, master password, admin approval, can create an account => offer
        for (enabled, device_is_trusted, has_master_password, has_admin_approval, can_create_account, expected) in [
            (false, false, false, false, false, None),
            (false, false, true, false, false, None),
            (false, true, true, false, false, None),
            (false, true, false, false, false, Some(true)),
            // Only a device that still unlocks is walked off, an administrator to ask is no reason to.
            (false, false, false, true, false, None),
            // Nothing set up, nobody to ask, and account creation would fail at the enrolment: the one
            // combination that would leave the account half built.
            (true, false, false, false, false, None),
            (true, true, false, false, false, Some(false)),
            (true, false, true, false, false, Some(false)),
            (true, false, false, true, false, Some(false)),
            (true, false, false, false, true, Some(false)),
        ] {
            let ways_in = TrustedDeviceWaysIn {
                device_is_trusted,
                has_master_password,
                has_admin_approval,
                can_create_account,
            };
            assert_eq!(
                ways_in.offer(enabled),
                expected,
                "{enabled} {device_is_trusted} {has_master_password} {has_admin_approval} {can_create_account}"
            );
        }
    }
}