vaultwarden/issues/TRACK-2025-11-09-RSA-PASTE.md

TRACK-2025-11-09: Remediate transitive rsa and paste advisories

Status: Open Owner: @maintainers (please assign) Created: 2025-11-09

Summary

This tracking issue records the planned remediation work for two transitive advisories found during the local audit on 2025-11-09:

• RUSTSEC-2023-0071 — rsa = 0.9.8 (Marvin Attack). No safe published upgrade was available at audit time. Transitive path: openidconnect -> ... -> rsa.
• RUSTSEC-2024-0436 — paste = 1.0.15 (unmaintained). Transitive path: rmp/rmpv -> paste.

Goals

1. Remove or replace the transitive dependency on rsa so the project does not depend on the vulnerable crate.
2. Replace or remove paste usage by migrating to a maintained alternative (e.g., pastey) or removing the transitive dependency chain.
3. Remove the temporary exceptions from deny.toml once remediation is complete.

Plan

1. Repro steps

   • Run cargo tree -i rsa and cargo tree -i paste to show the reverse dependency chain and confirm the top-level crate(s) importing them.

2. Investigate fixes

   • For rsa: identify whether openidconnect or another dependency directly pulls rsa. Check if newer published versions of the top-level crate avoid rsa.

   • If no published version removes rsa, assess vendor or patch options:

     • Replace openidconnect with an alternative OIDC client that avoids rsa (e.g., a crate using ring/openssl for crypto), or
     • Submit a PR to upstream crates to adopt a constant-time implementation, or
     • Vendor a small shim that provides the needed functionality using a vetted crypto library.

   • For paste: check if rmp/rmpv can be upgraded to eliminate paste or if a maintained fork (e.g., pastey) can be used.

3. Tests and validation

   • Add unit/integration tests for the replaced functionality (auth flows, message formats) to ensure behavior parity.
   • Re-run audit tooling in CI and verify cargo-deny no longer reports the advisories.

4. Timeline and owner

   • Target ETA: 2026-02-01 (three months). Adjust based on investigation findings.
   • Owner: @maintainers or assign a specific engineer.

5. Rollback/compensating controls

   • If remediation requires longer work, consider adding hardened monitoring, limiting feature usage, or using runtime mitigations where possible.

Links

• Audit note: SECURITY-AUDIT-2025-11-09.md
• PR branch: remediations/audit-2025-11-09

Next steps

• Assign an owner, run cargo tree -i rsa and cargo tree -i paste, and update this issue with findings and the chosen remediation path.