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Refuse rotations from a replaced user key, like upstream

Both rotation endpoints accept the optional oldUserKeyId. When it and the
stored key id are both set and differ, the rotation is refused with a 409
asking the client to sync, before the account keys are checked or anything
is written.

Also correct the comment on saving the signature key pair first: by then the
vault data is already re-encrypted, so a failure there doesn't keep the
account usable.
pull/7766/head
Daniel García 4 days ago
parent
commit
628b52b7e9
  1. 17
      src/api/core/accounts.rs

17
src/api/core/accounts.rs

@ -1203,6 +1203,7 @@ struct KeyData {
account_keys: AccountKeysData, account_keys: AccountKeysData,
account_data: RotateAccountData, account_data: RotateAccountData,
old_master_key_authentication_hash: String, old_master_key_authentication_hash: String,
old_user_key_id: Option<KeyId>,
new_user_key_id: Option<KeyId>, new_user_key_id: Option<KeyId>,
} }
@ -1266,6 +1267,7 @@ struct RotateUserKeysData {
unlock_data: CommonUnlockData, unlock_data: CommonUnlockData,
account_data: RotateAccountData, account_data: RotateAccountData,
unlock_method_data: UnlockMethodData, unlock_method_data: UnlockMethodData,
old_user_key_id: Option<KeyId>,
new_user_key_id: Option<KeyId>, new_user_key_id: Option<KeyId>,
} }
@ -1487,6 +1489,8 @@ struct RotateData {
account_keys: ValidatedAccountKeys, account_keys: ValidatedAccountKeys,
account_data: RotateAccountData, account_data: RotateAccountData,
unlock_data: CommonUnlockData, unlock_data: CommonUnlockData,
/// The id of the key the client rotates from, `None` from clients that don't send it.
old_user_key_id: Option<KeyId>,
/// `None` from clients that predate key ids. /// `None` from clients that predate key ids.
new_user_key_id: Option<KeyId>, new_user_key_id: Option<KeyId>,
/// The new user key, wrapped by the master key. /// The new user key, wrapped by the master key.
@ -1613,6 +1617,7 @@ async fn post_rotatekey(data: Json<KeyData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt:
account_keys: data.account_keys.validate()?, account_keys: data.account_keys.validate()?,
account_data: data.account_data, account_data: data.account_data,
unlock_data: common, unlock_data: common,
old_user_key_id: data.old_user_key_id,
new_user_key_id: data.new_user_key_id, new_user_key_id: data.new_user_key_id,
wrapped_user_key: unlock_data.master_key_encrypted_user_key, wrapped_user_key: unlock_data.master_key_encrypted_user_key,
new_password: Some((unlock_data.master_key_authentication_hash, password_hint)), new_password: Some((unlock_data.master_key_authentication_hash, password_hint)),
@ -1646,6 +1651,14 @@ async fn rotate_account(data: RotateData, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt: No
&existing_sends, &existing_sends,
)?; )?;
// Like upstream, a client that rotates a user key that was already replaced has to sync first
// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/15c94ac58bf361a162381749c146d254a21b2098/src/Core/KeyManagement/UserKey/Models/Data/BaseRotateUserAccountKeysData.cs#L34-L46>
if let (Some(current), Some(old)) = (&headers.user.key_id, &data.old_user_key_id)
&& current != old
{
err_code!("The user key being rotated is not the current user key. Sync and try again.", Status::Conflict.code)
}
validate_rotation_account_keys(&data.account_keys, &headers.user, &conn).await?; validate_rotation_account_keys(&data.account_keys, &headers.user, &conn).await?;
// An upgrade keeps the sessions; for an account already on v2 the token means nothing and is dropped // An upgrade keeps the sessions; for an account already on v2 the token means nothing and is dropped
@ -1768,7 +1781,8 @@ async fn rotate_account(data: RotateData, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt: No
user.reset_security_stamp_after_key_rotation(&conn).await?; user.reset_security_stamp_after_key_rotation(&conn).await?;
} }
// The key pair first: if saving the user then fails, an upgraded account stays v1 instead of broken // The key pair first, so that a v2 account is never saved without one. The data above is already re-encrypted by
// now, so a failure here still leaves it under a key that isn't stored (see the TODO before the first write).
data.account_keys.save_signature_key_pair(&user.uuid, &conn).await?; data.account_keys.save_signature_key_pair(&user.uuid, &conn).await?;
user.save(&conn).await?; user.save(&conn).await?;
@ -1833,6 +1847,7 @@ async fn post_rotate_user_keys(
account_keys: data.wrapped_account_cryptographic_state.validate()?, account_keys: data.wrapped_account_cryptographic_state.validate()?,
account_data: data.account_data, account_data: data.account_data,
unlock_data: data.unlock_data, unlock_data: data.unlock_data,
old_user_key_id: data.old_user_key_id,
new_user_key_id: data.new_user_key_id, new_user_key_id: data.new_user_key_id,
wrapped_user_key, wrapped_user_key,
new_password: None, new_password: None,

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