Print current server time when failing TOTP, and use chrono as the rest of the server

src/api/core/two_factor/authenticator.rs

@@ -103,7 +103,6 @@ pub fn validate_totp_code_str(user_uuid: &str, totp_code: &str, secret: &str, co
 
 pub fn validate_totp_code(user_uuid: &str, totp_code: u64, secret: &str, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
     use oath::{totp_raw_custom_time, HashType};
-    use std::time::{UNIX_EPOCH, SystemTime};
 
     let decoded_secret = match BASE32.decode(secret.as_bytes()) {
         Ok(s) => s,
@@ -116,24 +115,23 @@ pub fn validate_totp_code(user_uuid: &str, totp_code: u64, secret: &str, conn: &
     };
 
     // Get the current system time in UNIX Epoch (UTC)
-    let current_time: u64 = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
+    let current_time = chrono::Utc::now();
-        .expect("Earlier than 1970-01-01 00:00:00 UTC").as_secs();
+    let current_timestamp = current_time.timestamp();
 
     // The amount of steps back and forward in time
     // Also check if we need to disable time drifted TOTP codes.
     // If that is the case, we set the steps to 0 so only the current TOTP is valid.
-    let steps = if CONFIG.authenticator_disable_time_drift() { 0 } else { 1 };
+    let steps: i64 = if CONFIG.authenticator_disable_time_drift() { 0 } else { 1 };
 
     for step in -steps..=steps {
-        let time_step = (current_time / 30) as i32 + step;
+        let time_step = current_timestamp / 30i64 + step;
         // We need to calculate the time offsite and cast it as an i128.
         // Else we can't do math with it on a default u64 variable.
-        let time_offset: i128 = (step * 30).into();
+        let time = (current_timestamp + step * 30i64) as u64;
-        let generated = totp_raw_custom_time(&decoded_secret, 6, 0, 30, (current_time as i128 + time_offset) as u64, &HashType::SHA1);
+        let generated = totp_raw_custom_time(&decoded_secret, 6, 0, 30, time, &HashType::SHA1);
 
         // Check the the given code equals the generated and if the time_step is larger then the one last used.
-        if generated == totp_code && time_step > twofactor.last_used {
+        if generated == totp_code && time_step > twofactor.last_used as i64 {
-
             // If the step does not equals 0 the time is drifted either server or client side.
             if step != 0 {
                 info!("TOTP Time drift detected. The step offset is {}", step);
@@ -141,15 +139,15 @@ pub fn validate_totp_code(user_uuid: &str, totp_code: u64, secret: &str, conn: &
 
             // Save the last used time step so only totp time steps higher then this one are allowed.
             // This will also save a newly created twofactor if the code is correct.
-            twofactor.last_used = time_step;
+            twofactor.last_used = time_step as i32;
             twofactor.save(&conn)?;
             return Ok(());
-        } else if generated == totp_code && time_step <= twofactor.last_used {
+        } else if generated == totp_code && time_step <= twofactor.last_used as i64 {
             warn!("This or a TOTP code within {} steps back and forward has already been used!", steps);
-            err!("Invalid TOTP Code!");
+            err!(format!("Invalid TOTP code! Server time: {}", current_time.format("%F %T UTC")));
         }
     }
 
     // Else no valide code received, deny access
-    err!("Invalid TOTP code!");
+    err!(format!("Invalid TOTP code! Server time: {}", current_time.format("%F %T UTC")));
 }